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The homeland security enterprise (HSE) attempts to support the United States through 
many national mission spaces. Public works supports cities and communities through 
fundamental services and infrastructure at local levels that millions of citizens use and 
rely upon. The relationship between the HSE and public works is not often addressed, but 
it needs to be further explored. There are both traditional and nontraditional areas of 
intersection that relate the HSE and public works together that require coordinated 
efforts. These include infrastructure, resiliency, cyberspace, supervisory control and data 
acquisition systems, industrial control systems, and even emergent concepts such as 
cyber-physical systems. A qualitative method of analysis was used on the three areas of 
intersection (national preparedness and resilience, cyberspace safety and security, and 
presumption of cyber-physical). Ultimately, the findings of this thesis found a mixture of 
results with three varying relationships: adequate, mediocre, and inadequate.  
This thesis answers the research question, How can the relationship be improved 
between the homeland security enterprise and public works? This thesis also includes 
three sub-questions: a) What are the areas of intersection between the homeland security 
enterprise and public works? b) Is the relationship between the HSE and public works 
adequate or inadequate within the areas of intersection? c) What are recommendations 
for the future relationship between the HSE and public works?  
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The homeland security enterprise (HSE) is a comparatively new term added to the 
government’s list of acronyms following the attacks on 9/11. In broad terms, the HSE is 
comprised of many institutions and agencies that attempt to support the United States 
through numerous national mission spaces. These mission spaces are found in literature 
from a wide variety of sources and require sturdy relationships to continuously improve 
our nation’s security posture. Support of collective goals is on many governmental and 
private organizations in a coordinated effort. This thesis focuses on the discipline of 
public works’ contributions and role within it. 
Public works offers some of the most fundamental services and infrastructure 
needs of cities and communities throughout the nation. They have provided these services 
at local levels for generations. Physical evidence of public works presence abounds. This 
evidence is found in potable water delivered to homes, wastewater processed through 
sewer treatment facilities, road constructions, and more. One of the most notable periods 
for public works physical infrastructure was during the Great Depression of the early 
1930s. The New Deal utilized the Public Works Administration (PWA) to engineer and 
build monolithic infrastructure that was intended to bring the nation out of the recession. 
Other common responsibilities include disaster recovery and first response to incidents. 
The HSE and public works have common mission spaces, which can more 
accurately be described as “areas of intersection.” This thesis explores the relationship 
between the HSE and public works within the areas of intersection. This thesis also 
answers the primary research question: how can the relationship be improved between the 
homeland security enterprise and public works? In addition, this thesis answers three 
research sub-questions: a) What are the intersections between the homeland security 
enterprise and public works? b) Is the relationship between the HSE and public works 
adequate or inadequate within the areas of intersection? c) What are recommendations for 
the future relationship between the HSE and public works? 
 xvi 
This thesis used a qualitative “describe-compare-relate technique.” Within this 
analysis, the relationship between the HSE and public works was explored within three 
areas of intersection: 1) national preparedness and resilience, 2) cyberspace safety and 
security, and 3) presumption of cyber-physical. These areas were selected because they 
demonstrate the relationship between the HSE and public works in three different ways: a 
historic relevance, a current “hot topic,” and lastly an emergent field of study. 
Ultimately, the thesis found that the adequacy of the relationship varied across 
each area. It also found an area of overall adequate relationship through national 
preparedness and resilience. Additionally, it found an overall mediocre relationship 
within cyberspace safety and security. Finally, it found an inadequate area of relationship 
in presumption of cyber-physical. Each area of intersection that contains an inadequate 
relationship was addressed through corresponding recommendations for the future and 
next steps that can be taken. The final conclusion of this thesis presents potential areas for 
future study. 
National preparedness and resilience have a strong relationship between the HSE 
and public works but must continuously be nurtured in order to maintain this status. 
Preparedness and resilience are traditional characteristics of public works and are also 
important for the HSE. Cyberspace is a nontraditional mission space for public works, 
but it is continuously growing in importance. This area of intersection was determined a 
mediocre relationship with the HSE and public works, and it needs to be strengthened in 
order to maintain safe environments particularly regarding infrastructure. Cyber-physical 
systems are an emergent concept and have a potential future shared mission space 
between the HSE and public works. Cyber-physical is a developing field of cyberspace 
that integrates systems within systems. These systems of systems involve physical assets 
and controls of infrastructure, tightly coupled with computers, programming code, and 
the use of the Internet. This little explored area of cyberspace moves beyond the 
traditional sense of industrial control systems into a highly connected environment. 
Some data is published on the topic of cyber-physical, but it primarily originates 
from private industry and the education fields. Cyber-physical has been recognized as an 
important topic within the HSE, and public works offers capabilities to address it. 
 xvii 
However, this area of intersection is found by this research to be inadequate in the 
relationship between the HSE and public works, therefore requiring additional attention 
placed on this effort.  
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Pre-9/11 and before “homeland security,” public works entities had long been 
established throughout the United States. For generations, these entities have engineered, 
built, and maintained critical infrastructure throughout the United States. Public works 
has provided many fundamental services to communities everywhere—sanitation 
services, sewer treatment, freshwater distribution, traffic controls, civil engineering, and 
many more. Lasting results of physical public works infrastructure projects from the past 
can be seen still standing today. Even as early as the Roman Empire, one could look to 
the aqueducts and advanced sewer systems of the ages as evidence of systems designed 
for public service. 
Where United States history is concerned, a significant period commonly 
associated to the development of public works is found during the 1930s. A remarkable 
amount of monolithic infrastructure was built as part of the New Deal through the Public 
Works Administration (PWA). Many of the structures created still remain in use in 
modern time. In addition to bringing up the national economy, plans for preparedness and 
resilience during this period have always been a core role of public works. Whether 
preparations for flood control, drought conditions, or planned resilience through 
earthquake building standards, sewer systems, roads or interstates, public works has 
frequently been involved. 
In addition to physical infrastructure, public works has grown and adapted to the 
changing technical environment. As technology and cyberspace continuously escalates, 
public works has adopted some of its unique uses within daily operations. This is evident 
in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and industrial control 
systems (ICS). Physical facilities are becoming increasingly interconnected and reliant 
upon technology. Processes at local agencies are beginning to experience the effects of 
the “Internet of things” (IoT) and the “Internet of everything” (IoE). According to the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers: 
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The Internet of Things envisions a highly networked future, where most 
every object is integrated to interact with each other, allowing for 
communications between objects, as well as between humans and objects, 
which enables the control of intelligent systems in our daily lives.1 
This is even further enhanced with the IoE. The widely accepted concepts of the IoT and 
the IoE are beginning to move public works agencies into a cyber-physical environment. 
This intertwined environment involves infrastructure and cyberspace operations on a 
scale that is yet to be fully known but predicted to climb at an unruly pace. The concept 
of cyber-physical will further blur the lines between locally controlled public works 
equipment and an electronic interconnected web. 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
The HSE is a broad concept. It is not necessarily one organization, but it is made 
up of many disciplines, institutions and agencies to form a whole. However, a large 
responsibility of the HSE has a local component. Many of the contributors to the HSE are 
found at the local levels; law enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical services, 
and notably public works. According to Bloomberg, ex-mayor of New York, local 
government is where the potential for change has the greatest possibilities.2 
The HSE is a vast, expansive, multidisciplinary entity that has divergent mission 
spaces. Within this immense enterprise, guidance is often generalized to nationally 
address the needs of all state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies. Therefore, the topics 
are apt to be painted with broad brushstrokes without providing specifics for the many 
agencies found locally; one of these is public works. 
Local public works institutions have a more focused and narrow set of 
responsibilities with a more limited scope of influence, than the massive HSE. This 
influence remains local to communities, towns, and cities in which they serve. The 
United States Census Bureau reports there are 19,492 municipal governments and 16,519 
                                                 
1 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, “IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things, ,” 
accessed June 11, 2015, http://www.ieee-wf-iot.org/about.html.  
2 Bloomberg has been credited with a desire to be “mayor of the world.” Michael Scherer, “Michael 
Bloomberg Wants to Be Mayor of the World,” Time Magazine, October 21, 2013, http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,2154409,00.html.  
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town or township governments.3 Many of these municipal and townships include either 
their own public works agencies or employ the use of public-private contract 
partnerships. This dynamic is a glimpse of the substantial amount of resources, skilled 
personnel, and equipment upon which federal guidelines may be imposed to improve 
national goals using local resources.  
National preparedness and resilience have a strong relationship with the HSE and 
public works, but they must continuously be nurtured in order to maintain this status. 
Preparedness and resilience are traditional characteristics of public works and are 
important for the HSE. Cyberspace safety and security were found to be a mediocre 
relationship with the HSE and public works. Cyberspace is a non-traditional mission 
space for public works, but it is continuously growing in importance. This area of 
intersection needs to be strengthened in order to maintain safe environments regarding 
infrastructure that is becoming highly connected on the Internet. Cyber-physical systems 
is an emergent concept. Some data is published on the topic, but it primarily originates 
from private industry and the education fields. This concept has been recognized as 
important by the HSE, and public works has the skills and capabilities to address it. 
However, this area of intersection was found to be inadequate in the relationship between 
the HSE and public works, therefore requiring additional attention placed in this effort. 
This thesis examines the relationship concerning three primary intersecting areas 
between the HSE and public works. Roles and responsibilities within each of these areas 
may not be clearly defined or understood, yet they have consequences if not addressed. 
The three areas of intersection are: 1) national preparedness and resilience 2) cyberspace 
safety and security, and 3) presumption of cyber-physical systems.  
These three areas have been selected above other areas of focus for two reasons. 
First, they show a progression of duties and responsibilities over time—historically via 
preparedness and resiliency, currently via cyberspace, and emergently via cyber-physical. 
Second, these areas were selected due to the relevance that each areas have for both the 
                                                 
3 United States Census Bureau, “Population of Interest- Municipalities and Townships,” accessed May 
31, 2014, http://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html. 
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HSE and public works through overlapping mission spaces. This specific combination of 
topics has not received much, if any, academic study. 
The phrase “preparedness and resilience” is used quite often, but evidence 
suggests the term may not have a universal connotation. The Office and Management and 
Budget (OMB) refers to preparedness and resilience in the form of budgeting for climate 
concerns.4 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) refers to it in a host of 
threats, risks, and security concerns.5 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
and public health expresses preparedness and resilience in terms of behavioral, social, 
and medical concerns.6 Local public works agencies think of preparedness and resilience 
in a different way. They subscribe to the mantra “all disasters are local” and assert that 
full effort should be made at the local levels first.7 
“Cyberspace safety and security is another prolific topic. General cyberspace has 
grown to be one of the top homeland security concerns, and continues to escalate as an 
even greater worry. Cyberspace may often be associated with Internet security, website 
hacking, credit card fraud, identity theft, wireless technology hacks, or more. However, 
public works approaches this subject in a way that other government institutions do not. 
Public works is concerned with most of the same cyberspace threats that other institutions 
experience but on an entirely different level of threat. Public works operates within a 
cyberspace environment called industrial control systems (ICS). ICS contains unique 
computer systems and operations that need to be secure in a different manner than simply 
Internet connected devices such as computers. ICS also contain systems within systems. 
                                                 
4 Ali Zaidi, “Budgeting for Climate Preparedness and Resilience,” White House Blog, February 20, 
2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/20/budgeting-climate-preparedness-and-resilience-4. 
5 Threat hazard identification and risk assessments, known as THIRAs, are a function within Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that helps jurisdictions to understand some of the threats that 
may be within their area of responsibility. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, 2nd ed., August 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
8ca0a9e54dc8b037a55b402b2a269e94/CPG201_htirag_2nd_edition.pdf. 
6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 
National Standards for State and Local Planning. Preparedness Capabilities, March 2011, 
http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/capabilities/DSLR_capabilities_July.pdf. 
7 American Public Works Association Task Force, Emergency Management: Field Manual for Public 
Works (Kansas City, KS: American Public Works Association, 2003), http://www2.apwa.net/bookstore/
detail.asp?PC=PB.A337, 9.   
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The primary systems found within ICS systems are supervisory control and data 
acquisition systems (SCADA), traffic management control systems (TMC), or other 
industrial automation components. These systems are used, for example, in water 
distribution, wastewater processing, automatic train controls (ATC), bridge controls, 
flood control systems, or in other things. Cyberspace and the Internet are powerful means 
for public works to remotely access, monitor, and control equipment within these 
systems. The practice of connecting public works assets to the Internet poses greater 
vulnerabilities than systems that were formerly independent. One of the most notable 
instances of risk and damage to ICS systems is evidenced by the Stuxnet computer worm. 
This malicious electronic attack targeted both Iran’s centrifuges and, more recently, an 
industrial steel plant in Germany.8 
A future mission space for both the HSE and public works can be seen in the 
emergent field of cyberspace, which further integrates systems within systems. This little 
explored area of cyberspace, known as cyber-physical systems (CPS), moves beyond the 
traditional sense of ICS. Because this area of study has some elements of actual practice 
mixed with technology theory, there is both tangible literature addressing this topic and 
some presumptions of cyber-physical systems made by the author of this thesis. First, 
tangible literature will be discussed, which will have some presumptions sprinkled 
throughout 
One description of CPS according to DHS:.  
The concept of critical infrastructure as discrete, physical assets has 
become outdated as everything becomes linked to cyberspace. This 
‘cyber-physical convergence’ has changed the risks to critical 
infrastructure in sectors ranging from energy and transportation to 
agriculture and healthcare.9 
Another aspect of CPS is the rapidly growing “Internet of things” (IoT), and the 
“Internet of everything” (IoE). Once physical assets are connected and controlled through 
                                                 
8 The Stuxnet computer worm was used as a cyber attack against the Iranian nuclear program. It was 
directed and responsible for physical damages to centrifuges used for uranium enrichment.  
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Years 2014-2018 Strategic Plan,” accessed April 19, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY14-18%20Strategic%20Plan.PDF. 
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the Internet on a mass scale, such as with public works infrastructure, threat levels rise 
due to the sheer interconnectedness. The Internet certainly offers convenience. It helps 
reduce staff in order to do more work with fewer resources because it enables the ability 
to work remotely, but the risk of this convenience must be addressed. There have already 
been instances of crossover from cyberspace into the physical world as evidenced with 
the Stuxnet worm. This type of attack has been described as the “new era of war.”10 Leon 
Panetta has been credited with warning us that “the next Pearl Harbor that we confront 
could very well be a cyberattack that cripples.”11 Though this may partially refer to 
interconnected banking systems and personal information, the relationship between the 
HSE and public works is connected through industrial systems. Literature shows very 
little detailed strategy or long-term planning between the HSE and localized public works 
in this area. 
With regard to the known, yet varying roles of the HSE and public works, 
homeland security mission spaces have gaps or inefficiencies that can be solved in part 
by the resources and expertise of localized public works agencies within these three 
points of intersection. If used correctly, the furtherance of this relationship could 
strengthen both the HSE and public works through enhancement of these shared mission 
spaces. Better identification of these gaps is the first step to improving the relationship. 
The primary research question that is answered through analysis of this thesis is:.  
How can the relationship be improved between the homeland security enterprise and 
public works? 
The word “relationship” within the context of this thesis does not necessarily 
describe the interconnectedness between people, organizations, or agencies, but is more 
about the areas of intersections and mission spaces that are shared. For this thesis, each of 
the three areas of intersection (national preparedness and resilience, cyberspace safety 
and security, and presumption of cyber-physical) of HSE and public works is analyzed 
                                                 
10 Steve Kroft, “Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare,” CBS News, March 4, 2012, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare-04-06-2012/.  
11 Anna Mulrine, “CIA Chief Leon Panetta: The Next Pearl Harbor Could Be a Cyberattack,”Christian 
Science Monitor, June 9, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0609/CIA-chief-Leon-
Panetta-The-next-Pearl-Harbor-could-be-a-cyberattack.  
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using the describe-compare-relate analysis method.12 The results of analysis from each 
area of intersection determine whether or not the relationship between the HSE and 
public works is adequate or inadequate. Depending upon the type of relationship found, 
recommendations for a future plan of improvement for the HSE and public works are 
provided. This will answer the research sub-question: What are recommendations for the 
future relationship between the HSE and public works? The format of recommendations 
will follow an adaptation of the commander’s intent from Joint Publication 5.0 that 
addresses three key factors: purpose (desired), end state, and operational risk. 
In order to consider the relationship between the HSE and public works, both 
institutions must be more defined within the context of this thesis. This will provide a 
general understanding of fundamental roles that each institution plays and is described 
next. 
C. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC WORKS 
DEFINED 
This section provides some of the essential definitions of the HSE and public 
works in order to provide a basic foundational understanding for both institutions. 
Certainly, there is more data and definition surrounding both the HSE and public works 
than is included here, but not all of it will be addressed within the scope of this thesis. 
The majority of existing literature relating to the HSE focuses on high level 
responsibilities and roles of homeland security. This chapter mostly provides focused 
background data on public works in order to highlight the important potentials of public 
works’ contributions within the areas of intersection that may not be as well understood 
by all HSE practitioners. 
1. The Homeland Security Enterprise.  
The HSE is often used as an umbrella term that describes a collective of many 
institutions and disciplines. The combination can broadly include contributions from law 
enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical services, and others. Additionally, 
                                                 
12 Pat Bazeley, “Analyzing Qualitative Data: More Than ‘Identifying Themes,’” Malaysian Journal of 
Qualitative Research 2, no. (2009): 15.   
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these services can include members of public health, private industry, military, and more. 
Select tasks that each of the disciplines perform as part of the greater homeland security 
effort cause them to be a contributor of the HSE. This does not mean that their primary 
role is homeland security focused, but cumulatively they are all considered part of the 
HSE. 
The term HSE should not be confused with the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). DHS is the lead agency within the United States for homeland security efforts 
and was put into place shortly after 9/11. DHS is comprised of 22 agencies that 
previously reported to various other branches of government service. Since DHS is the 
lead agency, stating the broad DHS mission statement is in order. The mission of DHS is: 
“Our duties are wide-ranging, but our goal is clear: a safer, more secure America, which 
is resilient against terrorism and other potential threats.”13 The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) is one of the 22 agencies that aligns with some similar 
mission spaces of public works. FEMA is important in relation to public works because it 
operates on a federal level, but it will get involved on the ground with local disasters to 
provide funding and assistance as needed. According to DHS, “FEMA’s mission is to 
support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to 
build, sustain and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
recover from and mitigate all hazards.”14 
The United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) is another agency that is 
concerned with mission spaces of the HSE and public works. The USACE is not one of 
the DHS reporting agencies, but it is involved with national civil engineering projects. 
The USACE were heavily utilized in World War II efforts by building bridges, clearing 
land for airfields or bases of operations. Expertise found within the USACE is heavily 
reliant on civil engineering and has been for the past 236 years. The USACE at face value 
only appears focused on national assets, but there is more to its role. According to the 
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers website, “Through deeds, not words, we are BUILDING 
                                                 
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Mission of Homeland Security,” April 17, 2015, 
,http://www.dhs.gov/mission. 
14 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “About the Agency,” last modified January 31, 2015, 
http://www.fema.gov/about-agency.  
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STRONG.”15 A brief description of the USACE’s core values is: “With environmental 
sustainability as a guiding principle, our disciplined Corps team is working diligently to 
strengthen our Nation’s security by building and maintaining America’s 
infrastructure…”16 It is true the USACE focuses on national assets, but its responsibility 
towards U.S. assets can vary. The USACE is not exclusively dedicated to function inside 
the United States’ borders; it actually delivers services to 130 countries. The USACE also 
supports 600 dams domestically, and a dedicated part of its mission space is that 
“researches and develops technologies to protect the nation’s environment and enhance 
quality of life.”17 
The USACE resources are important assets to the nation, and USACE partners 
with local public works agencies. In addition, the USACE resources are also diversified 
in a much different way. For example, the USACE will interact with localities on specific 
projects for future planning or when its assets are involved within these areas. Removed 
from the day-to-day operations of local communities, the USACE gets involved when 
major disasters occur and infrastructure is affected. An example of this can be seen in 
recent deployments for Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, the Oso landslide, and 
many other incidents of natural disaster. The USACE also helps to develop after action 
reports (AAR) to assist with future preparedness and resilience efforts. One term that is 
frequently used in its vernacular is 50-, 100-, and 500-year event, which truly speaks of 
future efforts. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, a 100-year event such as flood is 
“a flood of that magnitude has a 1 percent chance of happening in any year.”18 The 100-
year event is currently referred to as a one-percent annual exceedance probability 
(AEP).19 
                                                 
15 U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, “About—Headquarters U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” accessed 
April 26, 2015, http://www.usace.army.mil/About.aspx.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  




2. Public Works 
At the most basic level, public works provides fundamental services to local 
communities. These services can greatly range from sewer services to drinking water 
distribution, from sanitation services to roadways, bridges to dams, incident response to 
critical infrastructure command and control. Public works’ agency duties can vary 
broadly based on the size, locale, jurisdiction, and even political climate. A commonly 
accepted definition of public works is communicated by the American Public Works 
Association (APWA) as “the combination of physical assets, management practices, 
policies and personnel necessary for government to provide and sustain structures and 
services essential to the welfare and acceptable quality of life for its citizens.”20 In 
addition, “public works” is often used as an umbrella term to identify public agencies that 
have vested interest in broad municipal and urban infrastructure projects, such as 
roadways or mass transit projects.  
Public works does not fall neatly under one chain of command. At a national 
level, for example, are the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT), and the Federal Highway Administration. Each agency provides 
the overarching guidance within its area of expertise, such as floodplains, dams, modes of 
transportation, and highway governance. Furthermore, each state may have its own DOT, 
and county or city entities have command and control of other infrastructure sectors. In a 
similar manner, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for water and 
wastewater concerns nationally, but it also sets some regulations at local levels. In order 
to accomplish many of the tasks placed on these agencies, public works may rely on 
public/private relationships to perform the work. Through a variety of relationship 
methods, today’s local public works maintains critical infrastructure as well as provides 
many basic needs within cities, towns, and communities everywhere in the United States. 
Historically, there are a few periods commonly associated with public works. 
Advanced sewer and water distribution systems were developed by the Roman Empire 
centuries ago. However, in the United States, the period commonly credited with a great 
                                                 
20 American Public Works Association, “What Is Public Works,” accessed May 31, 2014, 
http://www.apwa.net/discover/what_is_public_works.   
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deal advances in public works are the 1930s. During this time, as part of the New Deal to 
respond to the Great Depression (1933–1938), President Roosevelt created the Public 
Works Administration (PWA). The PWA was designed to counteract the financial 
downturn of the Great Depression, and it was the mechanism to put citizens back to 
work. As a result of this administration and as an outcome of the New Deal, monolithic 
critical infrastructure projects all around the country were built. A few examples include 
Hoover Dam, Fort Peck Dam, Grand Coulee Dam, the Triborough Bridge, and the 
Lincoln Tunnel. This infrastructure generally falls under the umbrella of “public works.”.  
In 1944, the Federal Aid Highway Act was passed, creating the national system of 
interstate and defense highways. According to the Federal Highway Administration:.  
In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944, the Congress acted on these 
recommendations. The act called for designation of a National System of 
Interstate Highways, to include up to 40,000 miles “… so located, as to connect 
by routes, direct as practical, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and 
industrial centers, to serve the National Defense, and to connect at suitable points, 
routes of continental importance in the Dominion of Canada and the Republic of 
Mexico.”21 
These roadways helped shape the boundaries of cities and were intended for military 
defensive purposes post WWII when the United States remained worried of the threat of 
war. A further result of the interstate system was the development of the strategic 
highway corridor network (STRAHNET), which came to be around 1945. STRAHNET 
is defined as: 
…a system of public highways that is a key deterrent in United States strategic 
policy. It provides defense access, continuity, and emergency capabilities for 
movements of personnel and equipment in both peace and war. Most large 
military convoys use the Strategic Highway Network. These routes connect 
military bases to the interstate highway network and include over 15,000 miles of 
roadway nationally. STRAHNET roadways are those which would be used for the 
rapid mobilization and deployment of armed forces in the event of war or 
peacekeeping activity.22 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, “Interstate System, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways,” last modified December 3, 2014, 
accessed May 30, 2015, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm. 
22 “Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET),” accessed March 28, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/strahnet.htm.  
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As it has been described, public works has contributed to a physical environment 
through construction and infrastructure development. In addition to evolving its physical 
contributions, public works has also evolved its technology use. Public works institutions 
began improving their capabilities with the addition of computer systems as early as the 
1960s. Whereas engineering designs that were once reliant upon manual drawing systems 
by a human hand, engineers today have become much more dependent on computer-
aided software systems and designs. The typical working environments of public works 
agencies now contain an integrated mixture of both physical and cyberspace workings. 
Technology has even become so critically important that regular reliance on cyber 
systems are commonplace, which will be further described next.  
Some of the cyberspace systems include supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems that are more broadly referred to industrial control systems (ICS).The 
energy sector has defined SCADA in this way: 
…generally refer to the systems which control, monitor, and manage the nation’s 
critical infrastructures such as electric power generators, subway systems, dams, 
telecommunication systems, natural gas pipelines, and many others. Simply 
stated, a control system gathers information and then performs a function based 
on established parameters or information it received.23 
Most modern SCADA systems typically function within a networked environment, 
frequently using sensors and other mechanisms for monitoring conditions. Sensors are the 
most important factor to note, and they serve as a form of intelligence collection for 
public works entities. Temperature controls, level indicators, erosion control, or water 
flow are just a few examples of sensor usage. In addition to sensors, series of 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs) are used. These 
units are a combination of hardware and software mini computers. PLCs can be explained 
by this definition from the International Journal of Computer Applications research 
journal: 
A PLC audits inputs, makes decisions according to its program, and uses these 
decisions to administer outputs to automate a process or machine. The PLC is 
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of Energy, Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems, version 
1.8, February 2008, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/
SCADA_Procurement_Language.pdf.  
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proficient in various tasks, including storage of instructions pertaining to 
sequencing, timing, counting, arithmetic, data manipulation and communication 
with the objective of controlling machines and processes.24 
RTUs have been defined by Scadaworld, a leading technical publication on the 
subject: 
RTUs are one of the major components of a SCADA System. It can automatically 
execute a simple logical process without involvement of a master computer and 
are being increasingly used…RTU is the link or connection to the physical 
instrument and from a switch or valve, it reads open and close status data. Apart 
from status data, it also reads pressure, flow, voltage and current measurements. It 
performs equipment control such as closing and opening of switch and valve or 
setting the pump speed. Analog measurement data or digital status data can also 
be read by RTU. After reading it can send analog set points or digital 
commands.25 
There are primarily three categories of infrastructure control systems in use today-
monolithic, distributed, and networked. SCADA monolith topology is now considered 
legacy technology and very basic in today’s technology terms. Monolithic refers to a 
standalone independent computer system, not connected to the Internet, and it is often 
highly proprietary equipment. Figure 1 visually demonstrates the concept of this first 
category of SCADA systems. This type of system was kept off of an organization’s 
common network, segmented, and operated independently from outside computer 
systems.26 Part of the reason for this was for security, but also because interconnected 
systems were not as commonplace then.  
                                                 
24 Richa Netto, and Aditya Bagri, “Programmable Logic Controllers,” International Journal of 
Computer Applications 77, no. 11 (2013): 27, accessed April 22, 2015, http://research.ijcaonline.org/
volume77/number11/pxc3891291.pdf  
25 SCADA World, “SCADA: Remote Terminal Units,” accessed May 1, 2015, 
http://www.scadaworld.net/remote-terminal-units.html.  
26 These three architecture types have been expanded upon by the author with the addition of images, 
Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4. The next images reinforce the basis of the concepts. Edvard, “Three 




Figure 1.  Monolith Basic SCADA Communication Topology, circa 2008.27 
The second type of system is a distributed system, referred to as a distributed 
control system (DCS). DCS uses local area networking technology integrated and 
connected to multiple other systems. This topology can be visually explained in Figure 2. 
This system type has become partially connected to the Internet cloud as indicated with 
the Internet link to the right. Unlike monolithic systems, distributed systems have become 
less proprietary in terms of equipment and software, and use some, but not all, common 
network protocols. 
                                                 
27 Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco, and Karen Kent, Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) and Other Industrial Control System Security (National Institute of Standards and Technology 






Figure 2.  Distributed Control System SCADA Communication Topology with 
Internet Integration.28 
The third type of system is a networked system. This topology begins to move 
away from proprietary systems into more standardized Internet technology protocol 
found in other computer networks. This can be visually explained in Figure 3. This 
system reflects connectivity to the “Internet cloud,” with firewall, corporate local area 
network (LAN), and multiple communication types. This begins to bring into focus in a 
simple way the progression of cyber-physical environments. 
                                                 





Figure 3.  Networked System SCADA Topology, Interconnected29 
SCADA systems broadly fall under industrial control systems (ICS). ICS is more 
clearly specifically by Public Safety Canada:.  
Industrial Control System (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types 
of control systems used to automate industrial processes, including supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems 
(DCS), and other smaller control system configurations such as programmable 
logic controllers (PLC).These systems are used in a variety of critical applications 
and industries including energy and utilities, transportation, health, 
manufacturing, food and water.30 
Now that both institutions and some components of them have been more narrowly 
defined, next are research questions that are addressed within this thesis. 
                                                 
29 Erik Johansson, Teodor Sommestad, and Mathias Ekstedt, “Security Issues for SCADA Systems 
Within Power Distribution” (presented at Royal Institute of Techhnology, Stockholm, Sweden), accessed 
April 17, 2015, http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:495747/FULLTEXT01.pdf.  
30 Public Safety Canada, “Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security: Recommended Best 
Practices Number: TR12-002,” December 10, 2012, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/cybr-ctr/2012/
tr12-002-eng.aspx.  
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary research question:.  
How can the relationship be improved between the homeland security enterprise 
and public works? 
Research sub-questions: 
1. What are the intersections between the homeland security enterprise and 
public works? 
2. Is the relationship between the HSE and public works adequate or 
inadequate within the areas of intersection? 
3. What are recommendations for the future relationship between the HSE 
and public works? 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
How can the relationship be improved between the homeland security enterprise 
and public works? This primary research question is answered through analysis of 
literature discovered through three areas of intersection identified between the HSE and 
public works. This thesis analyzes the relationship within the main areas of intersection 
1) national preparedness and resilience 2) cyberspace safety and security, and 3) 
presumption of cyber-physical systems. Within each of these areas, further supportive 
sub-questions provide added clarity through research design that holds strong literary 
evidence, ultimately answering the primary question. The qualitative nature of this 
research merits the use of three key tasks of the research design methodology: data 
collection, analysis, and output. Each task is consistently followed for each sub-question. 
Throughout analysis of the areas of intersection, characteristics of both 
institutions that identified the level of relationship emerged. The characteristics were 
identified through a series of boundaries used by the author that included a variation of 
empirical evidence, literature, efforts, and mission spaces. This evidence was not found in 
a single specific piece of literature or distinct responsibility but subsumed through the 
characteristics connecting them. While literature and effort certainly varies across the 
HSE and public works, key concepts clearly arose that demonstrated the strength of the 
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relationship. Each area of intersection was then labeled with one of three rating levels: 
adequate, mediocre, or inadequate. 
1. Sub-question 1 
What are the intersections between the homeland security enterprise and public 
works? 
a. Data Collection 
This question sets the beginning tone for this thesis and is where the majority of 
analysis takes place. The three areas of intersection help determine the parameters of this 
project (national preparedness and resilience, cyberspace safety and security, and 
presumption of cyber-physical systems). Discovery of the intersections are supported 
through a comprehensive literature review that was more often than not bounded by 
available existing publications. 
b. Analysis 
The method of analysis used in Chapter III is an adaptation of the describe-
compare-relate method. This analysis method is based on a research technique by Pat 
Bazeley, an associate editor for the Journal of Mixed Methods Research.31 It is fully 
outlined in the Malaysian Journal of Qualitative Research, Analysing Qualitative Data.32 
Additionally, it offers a way to organize and categorize each of the components. This 
method was used to organize the data and analyze each of the three intersections in a very 
consistent manner. 
The describe-compare-relate technique consists of three logical steps. Each step is 
repeated for the three identified areas of intersections. First, a description of the topic is 
thoroughly explained. This is fundamentally important because it provides context from 
both the HSE’s and public works’ perspective. Additionally, it provides the 
characteristics of the relationship within each intersection from existing literature and 
                                                 
31 Bazeley, “Analyzing Qualitative Data: More Than ‘Identifying Themes,’” 15.  
32 Ibid. 
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data. This step amplifies common themes, which are then used for further comparative 
analysis.  
Next, comparison of the characteristics and themes identified in the previous step 
is outlined. This outline identifies the variations in perspective from both HSE and public 
works. This reveals what type of relationship the institutions have with each other on the 
specified areas of intersection. The relationship may be either aligned or absent of 
association. This step forms context between the HSE and public works in terms of 
adequacy or inadequacy within each point of intersection.  
Lastly, relation of characteristics, themes, and contexts found in the previous steps 
is analyzed. This analysis shows examples of conditions under which the HSE and public 
works relate to each other. In other words, the conditions that brings the two institutes 
together toward a common goal. These conditions may be evidenced through actions, 
interactions, or strategies found in literature or data. Results from within the ‘“relate” 
analysis process are further used as evidence to answer the question: Is the relationship 
between the HSE and public works adequate or inadequate within the areas of 
intersection? 
c. Output 
The resulting output from the analysis within the areas of intersection identifies 
common mission spaces of the relationship or lack of commonality. The output within 
this section identifies the areas that are either adequate or inadequate in the relationship. 
The output from this section ultimately is put to further use in sub-question 2, which is 
addressed next.  
2. Sub-question 2 
Is the relationship between the HSE and public works adequate or inadequate 
within the areas of intersection?.  
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a. Data Collection 
The output from the literature collected and analyzed within the previous areas of 
intersection was used to answer this research sub-question. 
b. Analysis 
Analysis of the literature that answered this sub-question was previously 
performed within the areas of intersection using an adaptation of the describe-compare-
relate method. This thesis includes a literature review to determine common mission 
spaces and applicable literature that has been published on the subjects of HSE and public 
works from a variety of sources. Ultimately, this literature provided evidence for use in 
analysis within this research project.  
c. Output 
The desired output from analysis on the areas of intersection is used to determine 
if the relationship between the HSE and public works within the areas is either adequate 
or inadequate. Further output from analysis identifies the areas that require 
recommendations for improvement. The areas that require improvement are further 
expanded through recommendations for the future relationship, addressed next in sub-
question 3. 
3. Sub-question 3 
What are recommendations for the future relationship between the HSE and 
public works? 
a. Data Collection 
Data collected within the previous two sub-questions is now used as stepping 
stones to address this research sub-question. 
b. Analysis 
The result of analysis for sub-questions 1 and 2 has identified relationships 
between the HSE and public works as either adequate or inadequate. Recommendations 
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for the future relationship between HSE and public works were developed based on the 
results from those sections. The format of the recommendations section is an adaptation 
from military doctrine, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5.0), utilizing the 
simple commander’s intent; however, this is not intended to be all inclusive.33 
c. Output 
The output of this section offers recommendations for the most inadequate areas 
found within the relationship. The recommendations are designed to provide next steps 
for improving the future relationship between the HSE and public works. The overall 
output of this thesis is intended to be used by HSE and public works decision makers to 
address topic that have not yet been abundantly or academically studied. 
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter I has provided the introduction, problem space, and definitions that are 
used within this thesis. Chapter I also has presented the research questions and method of 
data collection, analysis, and output. Chapter II details the literature review. Chapter III 
contains analysis of the three identified areas of intersection between the HSE and public 
works. It describes the past roles, the present condition, and potential future of public 
works’ roles within the HSE. Each section describes, compares, and relates each of the 
components in a methodical manner. Finally, Chapter IV completes the thesis with a 
summary of findings, offers recommendations for consideration of the future relationship 
surrounding the HSE and public works, and final conclusion remarks.  
                                                 
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5-0), 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf, III-17.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review is separated into categories that do not follow the same 
sequence of the analysis chapter. This is intended to demonstrate multiple literary bodies 
of knowledge that originate from many various sources. The primary categories of 
literature found easily group into eight categories: national institutions, localized 
agencies, media and news, advocacy group and associations, cyberspace and cyber-
physical, academic and analytic studies, technical and engineering, and multi-categorical. 
Though there are multiple divergent sources, they still cumulatively support the areas of 
intersection. 
B. LITERATURE SOURCE CATEGORIES 
Ultimately, the literature and research provides the necessary support and 
evidence to answer each of the research questions confidently; yet, it leaves room for 
further research opportunities through the recommendations for the future that are 
proposed in the conclusion chapter. This literature review is important because it 
demonstrates the lack of research relating to the HSE and public works. 
1. National Institutions 
The first category of literature is large national institution sources. Some are 
directly related to the HSE, and others support common mission spaces between them 
and other institutions. For example, DHS is homeland security centric, whereas the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHA) addresses roadways, highways, and interstates. 
The FHA is not overly concerned with homeland security but with a “big picture” 
perspective. Both FHA and even state department of transportations (DOTs) often 
perform duties that assist with the grander missions of homeland security and 
transportation systems. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has national mission spaces, but it also 
interacts at local levels. One source of literature regarding the DOD nexus to public 
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works is found specifically through United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE). 
The USACE provides national civil engineering support to the nation, so considerable 
literature from this institution addresses engineering related topics. Some examples of 
USACE literature include after action reports (AAR) and white papers in response to 
major natural disasters.34 However, the USACE does not completely focus solely on the 
United States; it also has worldwide responsibilities in some cases. In general terms, 
literature from the USACE focuses on engineering concerns, both domestically and 
abroad.  
There are some negative views on the USACE. Some literature points blame of 
massive disaster consequences to the USACE. One major event that demonstrates this 
scenario is Hurricane Katrina. A federal judge attempted to assign responsibility to the 
USACE for not protecting the citizens during periods of immense flooding.35 Though 
these critiques found in literature are taken into consideration, not as much merit was 
given to these sparse critiques. Overall, disasters are still disasters regardless of where 
they occur, and engineering solutions still remain at the core. The USACE, the HSE and 
public works are all in agreement based on a review of the majority of the literature. 
A further nexus of the DOD to public works is found in literature that addresses 
the Strategic Highway Corridor Network (STRAHNET). The STRAHNET is nationally 
important due to the relationship between public highways that are partially used for 
armed forces movement and military defensiveness purposes throughout the nation.36 
Literature is not readily available the public concerning on full details of the 
STRAHNET, but sufficient literature is available to identify its importance.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is another source of national 
literature. Although a national institution, influence of the EPA has local implications. 
These local implications occur because the EPA governs some local public works 
                                                 
34 U.S.Army Corp of Engineers, USACE Capacity Development White Paper, 2008, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/MILCON/USACE_CD_White_Paper_June2008.pdf.  
35 Mark Schleifstein, “Federal Judge Blasts Army Corps of Engineers for Failing to Protect New 
Orleans during Katrina,” The Times-Picayune Greater New Orleans, April 15, 2013, http://www.nola.com/
environment/index.ssf/2013/04/federal_judge_blasts_army_corp.html.  
36 “Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET).”   
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processes, such as freshwater distribution and wastewater operations. Again, not directly 
related to homeland security, but there is still a strong nexus to it because of concerns 
with environmental and health concerns. Examples of EPA literature contains pertinent 
information includes “fracking” analysis, case studies, laboratory studies, and other 
reports.37 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury is an almost obvious place to find literature 
on financial topics related to government spending in relation to the HSE and public 
works. The Department of the Treasury understands there is great need for infrastructure 
resiliency, and it has developed a formal plan to obtain financing to resolve the lack of 
funding problem. One of its proposed solution entails “innovative financing” through 
many means, as found publications through the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office 
of Economic Policy.38 Other financially applicable literature pertains to an initiative 
called the Build America Transportation Investment Center (BATIC). This plan has been 
endorsed by the President of the United States. It is based on the premise of a 
“government-wide initiative to increase infrastructure investment and economic growth 
by engaging with state and local governments and private sector investors to encourage 
collaboration, expand the market for public-private partnerships (PPPs).”39 
Additional literature is found via the Highway Trust Fund. The Highway Trust 
Fund offers financial backing to the transportation industry with money generated by 
                                                 
37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Science in Action Innovative Research for a Sustainable 
Future, “EPA’s Hydraulic Fracturing Study: Retrospective Case Studies,” accessed July 5, 2015, 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/
final_retro_case_study_fact_sheet_6_03_508_km.pdf.  
38 As stated in a report from the Office of Economic Policy, “Notwithstanding the United States’ deep 
municipal bond market, innovative financing for infrastructure investment is becoming increasingly 
important as public budgets continue to tighten all levels of government. This section outlines the main 
methods of alternative financing today: PPPs, the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act 
(TIFIA), the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program (RRIF), direct pay taxable 
bonds (such as Build America Bonds), tax-exempt qualified private activity bonds (PABs), and credit 
enhancement. PPPs can make use of many of the other alternative financing options, including using some 
combination of those resources.” U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy, Expanding 
Our Nation’s Infrastructure through Innovative Financing, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Documents/
Expanding%20our%20Nation%27s%20Infrastructure%20through%20Innovative%20Financing.pdf.  
39 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Build America,” last modified June 5, 2015, accessed July 1, 
2015, http://www.transportation.gov/buildamerica.  
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federal fuel taxes. A surplus amount within this fund to continuously upgrade the nation’s 
roadways is required. However, the fund is quickly depleting, often referred to as a 
“shortfall,” and there are fears that the fund will dry out this year (2015). Literature on 
this topic is readily available from media sources, but an authority on the subject is the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO).40 
DHS is most often considered the lead agency for many homeland security 
efforts; therefore, a tremendous amount of literature is published by them. Though there 
are many references to DHS literature within this thesis, the author has made every 
attempt to find and utilize literature from other sources as well. A significant portion of 
DHS’s guidance documents and doctrine were reviewed. Some of these institutions 
include FEMA, in terms of national policy; the White House, which produces national 
literature; and FEMA, which produces considerable framework documents, reports, and 
emergency support functions. Among the many documents available published by the 
HSE, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) stands apart.41 All three 
primary areas of intersection addressed in this thesis are found within this document. This 
document is released every four years, and it highlights the most important and 
concerning and prominent topics to HLS professionals. 
The mission spaces of the HSE are generically stated as “wide-ranging;” 
therefore, not all HSE mission spaces were researched or analyzed for this thesis. Some 
mission spaces are not appropriate in a public works relationship. For instance, 
peacekeeping or border issues are hefty HSE mission spaces and involve law 
enforcement agencies to handle this issue.42 These mission spaces clearly do not apply to 
public works because public works does not have the authority, skill-set, expertise, and, 
perhaps most importantly, need to be involved.  
                                                 
40 The term depletion is often used in the form of shortfall. U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
Statement for the Record: Status of the Highway Trust Fund, Sarah Puro, Analyst for Surface 
Transportation Programs, Committee on the Budget U.S. House of Representatives, April 24, 2013, 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44093-HighwayTrustFund.pdf.  
41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 2014, 
accessed January 23, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf.  
42 Land, sea, air support are not any mission spaces of public works. U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, “Secure and Manage Borders,” November 13, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/secure-and-manage-
borders.  
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Nationally, the power industry receives considerable attention due to the 
importance of its business. Everyone operates and needs power; therefore, the 
requirements and literature within this industry are considerable. Literature reveals 
structured, standardized regulations and literature that is not always found in other public 
works institutions. An example of literature is from the North American Energy 
Regulatory Committee, Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC-CIP). NERC’s mission 
is to “assure the reliability of the bulk power system in North America. NERC develops 
and enforces Reliability Standards; annually assesses seasonal and long‐term reliability; 
monitors the bulk power system through system awareness; and educates, trains, and 
certifies industry personnel.”43 Not only does NERC offer literature, it also offers long-
term planning strategies as found in the Reliability Standards Development Plan 2015–
2017.44 
In general, literature from national institutions agrees more often than not with 
local agency endeavors within the areas of intersection. There are larger big picture 
issues, however, that are national concerns that do not involve local institutions. Overall, 
based on literature, there is a symbiotic relationship between national and local 
institutions. 
2. Localized Agencies 
In addition to that of national institutions, this thesis includes a literature review 
of local institutions. The local sources have considerable bodies of knowledge on many 
various topics relating more specifically to the details of local operations versus broad 
overarching concepts found nationally. Literature in direct relationship to HSE mission 
spaces were not found in abundance. Indirectly, however, literature of local agencies 
provided sources that referenced policies and procedures that do overlap with HSE 
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mission spaces. Examples of this overlap include engineering, infrastructure, 
preparedness and resilience, and other aspects found within this thesis that have direct 
relationship to the HSE without explicit written connection.  
An aspect found in the literature from local agencies took into consideration is 
that the local agencies infrequently publish their local policies and procedures out of 
concern for confidential information surrounding their operations. Literature that was 
found fairly abundant from local sources included financial commitments and capabilities 
found locally. For example, the city of Riverside in California has spent $240 million on 
sewer infrastructure improvements; this cost was absorbed by from city funds.45 This 
keeps the community sanitarily safe in conjunction with California health law through 
improved services.46 Though not all major construction projects are directly related to the 
HSE, there still is a homeland security nexus because of concerns for human health and 
the environment.  
Still considered relatively local, literature at state levels was also reviewed. 
California specifically is a good source of literature because of the varied threats, 
incidents, and environmental incidents it faces and its related laws. Some of the incidents 
include earthquakes, oil spills, gas line explosions, and mudslides. 
In addition, the research includes literature from other states because of historical 
disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana or Superstorm Sandy in Massachusetts 
and New York. There are some laws regarding disaster recovery efforts that are unique to 
a number of states. For example, California demonstrates the importance placed on 
disaster recovery effort through legality. California Government Code 3100–3109 reveals 
that a common requirement placed on public employees is mandatory disaster service 
                                                 
45 Alicia Robinson, “Riverside: Wastewater Plant Getting $240.8 Million Upgrade,” The Press 
Enterprise, August 9, 2013, http://www.pe.com/articles/plant-675922-riverside-wastewater.html. 
46 California Department of Public Health, Title 22, California Code of Regulations, Health Services, 
2013, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/drinkingwater/Documents/Recharge/
DraftRechargeReg2013-03-28.pdf. 
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worker (DSW) status. In manner similar to fire services and law enforcement, DSW is 
part of public works’ “duty to act.”47 
Another area of literature from localities is tied to emergency operations centers 
(EOCs). EOCs make accommodations to put forth effort to include public works agencies 
when possible at local levels. An area traditionally made up of emergency management, 
fire departments, or law enforcement agencies, public works has become included now 
more than ever in local responder operations. Public works often has a “seat at the table,” 
which allows it to contribute to the greater effort both before and after incidents occur.  
Local public works agencies maintain systems that do not get much literature 
attention but remain very important in city functions. An example of a system like this is 
traffic management control systems (TMC). While is little literature found locally, there 
is even less national literature relating to it. The majority of literature is found 
retroactively, as in the case of the literature on an incident in Los Angeles when its 
system was hacked.48 Even though the system was hacked and received media attention 
at the time, there has not been much, if any proposed legislation imposed on these 
services. There is the National Committee on Unified Traffic Control Devices 
(NCUTCD), which addresses consistency in signage standards, but there does not seem 
to be any enhancement toward cyberspace security policies or standards on equipment.  
3. Media and News 
Next, media and news sources are abundant in the literature. Media as a source of 
literature is integrated throughout many of the topics, but it should be noted that not all of 
these sources are reputable and reliable. Only the most applicable articles were used as 
sources, for example, current public works disaster news, such as a commuter rail crash 
in Pennsylvania. News outlets have extensively and historically addressed a myriad of 
topics, from critical infrastructure, to financial spending, cyberspace, and more. 
                                                 
47 Legislative Counsel State of California, “California Government Codes 3100-3109,” accessed June 
15 2015, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=03001-04000&file=3100-
3109. 
48 Shelby Grad, “L.A. NOW,” Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2009, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
lanow/2009/12/engineers-who-hacked-in-la-traffic-signal-computers-jamming-traffic-sentenced.html  
 30 
Additionally, media and news sources pay considerable attention to disasters and 
frequently focus on both the roles of HSE and public works within these situations. 
Media perspectives can shine either a positive or negative light on disaster situations. 
Premature determinations and finger-pointing may also occur during the time of incident, 
which may not necessarily have merit. This research took into consideration these types 
of narratives within the media and news. 
4. Advocacy Groups and Associations 
The next category of literature includes advocacy groups and associations on 
behalf of public works as a discipline. One of these primary organizations, the American 
Public Works Association (APWA), regularly publishes public works literature. The 
APWA often releases generalized “advocacy position statements” on behalf of all public 
works entities. The content of these statements covers a myriad of topics and only 
sparsely references the term “homeland security.” However, in a larger context, the 
APWA is supporting the HSE through protection of both physical infrastructure and 
cyberspace. In addition, the APWA has called for further effort on this topic, as 
evidenced in a published cyberspace advocacy position statement, titled “Public Works 
and Cyberspace.”49 Within this statement, the primary purpose focuses on the 
“importance of maintaining and fully funding a national cyberspace response system that 
manages cyber-risk for the protection of critical infrastructure.”50.  
The APWA also publishes literature that is structured and formal and used 
throughout many public works institutions as part of normal business. One example is the 
Emergency Management Field Manual for Public Works.51 This manual is intended to be 
standard methodology for public works’ field staff to follow in some of the more 
common situations. The APWA is one of the leading public works’ supportive 
associations and typically is bound by task force and committee oversight to ensure the 
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51 American Public Works AssociationTask Force, Emergency Management, 9.  
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content of manuals, such as Emergency Management Field Manual for Public Works, is 
appropriate. 
Another advocate for public works related topics is the American Society for 
Civil Engineers (ASCE). This organization produces considerable literature, but one of 
the most noteworthy is a quadrennial report card that identifies and rates the overall 
condition of the nation’s infrastructure. Within this report, infrastructure is given 
structurally sufficient/deficient ratings. In 2013, the overall the United States was given a 
grade of D+.52 The term “structurally deficient” divides some institutions into two 
separate positions regarding the meanings of this phrase. One line of thinking reveals that 
the general public perceives the term “structurally deficient” as an immediate threat and 
interprets it to mean that infrastructure will inevitably crumble and fall. The term may 
scare people; however, there is another side to the meaning as well. The Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) tells us “structurally deficient” is not really as bad as the public 
perceives.53 The United States DOT further explains the term structurally deficient:.  
Structurally deficient bridges are not inherently unsafe. Bridges are 
considered structurally deficient if significant load-carrying elements are 
found to be in poor or worse condition due to deterioration and/or damage, 
or if the adequacy of the waterway opening provided by the bridge is 
determined to be extremely insufficient to the point of causing intolerable 
roadway traffic interruptions. 
The classification of a bridge as structurally deficient does not imply that 
it is likely to collapse or that it is unsafe. By conducting properly 
scheduled inspections, unsafe conditions may be identified; if the bridge is 
determined to be unsafe, the structure must be closed. A deficient bridge, 
when left open to traffic, typically requires significant maintenance and 
repair to remain in service and eventual rehabilitation or replacement to 
address deficiencies. To remain in service, structurally deficient bridges 
                                                 
52 American Society of Civil Engineers, “About America’s Infrastructure: 2013 Report Card for 
America’s Infrastructure,” 2013, accessed January 16, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/
executive-summary/. 
53 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Policy and Governmental 
Affairs, “Conditions and Performance: Chapter 3, System Conditions,” last modified November 7, 2014, 
accessed May 9, 2015, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2013cpr/chap3.htm. 
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often have weight limits that restrict the gross weight of vehicles using the 
bridges to less than the maximum weight typically allowed by statute.54 
The interpretation of the term structurally deficient is an area of debate between the 
citizenry and its perception, the engineering agencies that monitor the structures, and 
other public works institutions. 
Other publications that produce a significant amount of literature include the 
freshwater and wastewater distribution industries. Common mission spaces between the 
HSE and public works relating to this topic are amply found within industry magazines 
such as WaterWorld, Public Works Magazine, and the American Water Works 
Association (AWWA) Journal. In addition, Water & Wastes Digest (W&WD), Treatment 
Plant Operator (TPO) Magazine, and the Water and Power Report all provide current 
events and even recent technology advancements as part of this segment within the public 
works industry. In addition to the HSE and public works nexus, these sources also 
provide a mechanism to showcase or advertise innovative new projects or processes that 
have been implemented. 
Overall, advocacy groups and associations contribute significantly to the body of 
literature relating HSE, public works, and private organizations together. Some of the 
advocacy groups’ literature and statements are biased, but several others reveal a 
common agreement between the groups. 
5. Cyberspace and Cyber-Physical 
Literature concerning categories of cyberspace and cyber-physical were found 
throughout many sources. Cyberspace related data is much more abundant through 
sources that include academic publications, books, media, and even some historical 
sources that address cyberspace concerns. The topic of cyber-physical has less literature 
than that of cyberspace, but there is sufficient data available to perform analysis. 
From the review of the literature, it is apparent there are two divided components 
of cyberspace, particularly as it relates to this thesis project—cyberspace and cyber-
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physical. First, cyberspace literature from the general public’s perspective tells us about 
standard Internet threats, such as credit card fraud, bank fraud, and other usual suspects. 
The concern for cyberspace safety and security has been made evident through literature, 
such as the worldwide threat assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.55 U.S. 
intelligence agencies even place a greater likelihood of cyber attack and cyber criminals 
as the top threats to the country above all other potential threats.56 
Secondly, cyberspace literature that focuses on industrial facilities is commonly 
generated through diverse groups having specific technical expertise in this separate area 
of study. There is less literature within this area because of the uniqueness of industrial 
environments that combines physical assets to complex cyber systems. The technologies 
and environments for industrial uses are collectively called industrial control systems 
(ICS). ICS systems further contain networks environments called supervisory control and 
data Acquisition (SCADA) systems or distributed control systems (DCS).  
Literature relating to ICS, SCADA, or DCS environments often contains 
references to unique threats that other standard cyberspace systems do not have. These 
unique threats come in the form of viruses such as the Stuxnet worm. Literature shows 
that this virus was used as an electronic, yet physical, attack on Iranian centrifuge 
facilities and a German steel mill. Both caused physical destruction of assets. The 
Industrial Control Systems-Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) and National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are two of the leading organizations that 
address and publish literature relating to ICS. They both produce reputable literature on 
best methods and white papers relating to cyber security and safety. 
There has been recent attention on passenger rail systems because of a tragic 
commuter train derailment in Pennsylvania, where eight people died and 200 were 
                                                 
55 Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Office of the Director of National Security, January 
2014, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/
2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SSCI_29_Jan.pdf. 
56 “US Spy Chief James Clapper Highlights Cyber Threats,” BBC News, February 27, 2015, 
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injured.57 This incident raised newfound concerns for the initiative to install positive train 
controls (PTC) within the rail service industry and required by the Federal Railroad 
Administration.58 The “monitor and control” components of PTC are maintained through 
SCADA systems, where speed and braking can be electronically managed by either 
electronic alerts or through an operator. 
Many of the ICS and SCADA system concepts move into the next step of real-
time monitoring and sensor networks—an area where additional literature is found. 
Advanced sensor technologies are becoming more essential in many environments now. 
Some of the sources that address this body of literature include public workgroups, 
professional associations, academic institutions, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), and even the National Science Foundation (NSF). All of these sources 
cover a variety of capacities, including technology, engineering, science, and services to 
HSE professionals. One of the commonalities between these organizations is that they 
each provide new research and development on emergent topics such as 3D printing, big 
data management, advanced weaponry, smart energy, and cyber-physical studies. 
The next area of literature is found in support of cyber-physical systems. Other 
literature on this topic reveals academic and established institutions that study and work 
with industrial control systems. Specific examples include Cal-Tech and the U.S. 
Geological Society. These institutions are concerned with earthquake early warning 
systems and weather related events. The related literature often discusses the use of vast 
sensor networks. Sensor networks offer a method of data retrieval from physical assets, 
and then in turn the data are sent electronically to data repositories. There are many 
institutions that are interested in cyber-physical systems aside from earthquake warning 
and weather systems. One such industry is electrical power distribution.  
Power relies greatly upon sensors, and they even take this one step further. The 
power industry also uses software systems that monitors and measures certain attributes 
                                                 
57 Greg Botelho, and Dana Ford, “Amtrak Crash: Train Sped up before Derailment,” CNN, May 14, 
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58 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control (PTC) 
Information (R&D),” accessed July 5, 2015, https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0152. 
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of their sensor systems. These systems are called the Smart Grid. Since the Smart Grid is 
essentially a system of systems that has been successfully utilized for quite some time, 
other industries are beginning to take note. In this case, a system of systems equates to 
technology used as the management tool wedged between cyber space and physical 
infrastructures. Often, literature related to cyber-physical presents two distinct views.  
Typically, literature argues the need to further understand cyber-physical, or it 
argues that there is a growing concern for security of these systems because of the risk 
involved. Prominent in the growing body of literature, the Smart Grid involves the use of 
the IoT and the IoE. These concepts are becoming more integrated into this environment 
than ever before. The definition of the IoT was found from the IEEE and explains how it 
inter-relates to the Smart Grid: 
The Internet of Things envisions a highly networked future, where every 
object is integrated to interact with each other, allowing for 
communications between objects, as well as between humans and objects, 
which enables the control of intelligent systems in our daily lives.59 
On the IoT and the IoE, the literature points to a theory that most any type of 
physical device can be attached to the Internet via a network interface “anything that can 
be connected, will be connected.”60 On a small consumer scale, literature was reviewed 
for residential devices that are beginning to become web dependent. Some residential 
appliances that have these capabilities include refrigerators, thermostats, and even 
lighting. This literature was not used within the thesis, but it does demonstrate the 
capabilities of the IoT and the IoE. 
A further review of literature pertaining to the IoT and the IoE was sourced. 
Literature originating from private organizations, news articles, and academic studies is 
fairly abundant from academic and media sources for each. There is more, however, on 
the IoT than there is on the IoE, but both are relatively new and growing areas of study 
within the technology environment. This literature can also be found in publications such 
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as technology journals and those from news outlets. A review of the literature revealed an 
additional component to the IoT and the IoE is the industrial Internet of things (IIoT). 
Though there is literature, the usefulness of including the IIoT in this thesis was minimal 
from the author’s perspective, and therefore it is excluded. This concept is less studied, 
but it is found primarily in professional associations, such as the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and NIST.61 
Since the topic of cyber-physical is still considered emergent, there are areas of 
speculation within the literature. There is sufficient literature to use in this thesis since 
cyber-physical is analyzed as a “presumption” by the author. Literature that was found 
reputable originated from technical news sources, Carnegie Melon, and Beecham 
Research. These sources of literature help set the stage for the presumption of cyber-
physical endeavors. 
Though an abundance of literature has been presented in this section, there is no 
discernable controversy within the literature. Cyberspace and cyber-physical are areas 
that are considered universally as important, yet vulnerable. 
6. Academic and Analytic Studies 
The next category of literature falls under academic and analytic study and 
included searching libraries. In some cases, the topics addressed within this thesis have 
been abundantly studied with academic circles. The literature sources include the RAND 
Corporation, the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), the American Academy of 
Environmental Engineers and Scientists (AAEES), and the Brookings Institute, 
specifically focusing on infrastructure.62 In addition, there are other organizations that 
advocate for public works that frequently involve engineering groups. Some of these 
organizations include the American Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE), American 
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Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA), and the Rockefeller Foundation, which sponsors and provides 
literature regarding city chief resilience officers.63 Literature from these public works 
groups often address critical infrastructure, such as transportation systems, dams, bridges, 
and other civil engineering projects. 
The term resiliency is one area where competing arguments were found. Although 
there are many initiatives toward preparedness and resilience, there are also critics that 
say “owners” are not doing enough toward resiliency. For example, according to Post:.  
‘The U.S. has been somewhat paralyzed in the development of an 
effective building-resiliency response by the extreme politicizing of the 
topic of climate change,’ says Ben Sandzer-Bell, chief resilience officer 
for Climate Adaption Solutions. ‘The level of political toxicity prevents 
effective engagement by a large segment of the American body politic, 
industry, academia, NGOs and media.’64 
Additionally, some of the literature entails other country’s involvement in similar efforts 
extending the uses of sensors infrastructure. One example is South Korea, where one of 
the most technologically interconnected bridges in the world is located, the Jindo Bridge.  
7. Technical and Engineering 
The next category of literature that reviewed includes technical and engineering 
journals. Civil and electrical engineering play a large role in the discipline of public 
works; therefore, there is a substantial body of knowledge found within this arena. Public 
works adheres to engineering standards in construction projects. Literature on 
construction documentation was reviewed but not at a granular level. The literature 
includes organization building codes, such as the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA) codes and standards. NFPA dictates codes and standards through 250 technical 
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committees and even participates within the electrical community as a training 
authority.65 
The Greenbook is an invaluable public works and construction industry resource 
used in the field.66 The Greenbook is a book of standard construction plans, 
specifications, and provisions compiled in joint effort by a committee of industry 
professionals and endorsed by many states. In a broad sense, it is the public works’ 
“bible,” which is compiled by industry experts and has been used in the construction 
industry since 1967.  
Another institution contributing to the technical and engineering literature is the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). It is the largest organization 
“dedicated to advancing technological innovation and excellence for the benefit of 
humanity.”67 This organization produces considerable literature on the subject relating to 
industrial control systems.  
Yet another source of technical and engineering literature is the National 
Academy of Engineering (NAE), which is an academic group focused on support of the 
engineering profession. The NAE is utilized within the discipline of public works as an 
academic resource third party often to engineers. In addition, the NAE primarily 
publishes literature on the subject matter pertaining to engineering controls and policies. 
Finally, literature found within the NAE addresses events that encompass broad big-
picture issues. One of the other academic sources included the RAND Corporation. This 
organization was also categorized within the academic and analytic section; however this 
source also provided relevant technical literature.  
These sources frequently produce analytical literature and data that is detailed and 
comprehensive on many governmental topics, including public works. Since they are 
used frequently by many government agencies, there is considerable, reputable literature 
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which includes studies on transportation, post hurricane events, critical infrastructure, 
physical security, cyber security, and even public works projects.  
8. Multi-categorical 
Some of the topics were split among many of the literature sources; therefore, 
they do not fit neatly into one of the defined categories of literature. For example, critical 
infrastructure is often directly related to resilience and is addressed by many sources, 
including the HSE, public works, engineering organizations, and a lot of news media 
coverage. Historically, critical infrastructure from a public works perspective has been 
physical assets such as structures, buildings, or facilities. The paradigm has shifted 
slightly since 9/11—or has at least gained more attention. According to Collins and 
Baggett, “…prior to the events of September 11, 2001, the term ‘infrastructure’ primarily 
referred to the U.S. public works system, which included systems such as roadways, 
bridges, water and sewer systems, airports, seaports and public buildings.”68 Literature 
relating to critical infrastructure deviates from simply a public works perspective; it 
involves many sectors. The topic of critical infrastructure revealed more literature than 
expected by the author and from a wide variety of sources.  
Ultimately, the literature and research provides the necessary support and 
evidence to answer each of the research questions confidently, yet leaves room for further 
research opportunities through recommendations that are proposed in the conclusion 
chapter. 
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III. AREAS OF INTERSECTION 
There are several areas of intersection between the HSE and public works. Three 
have been identified for the purposes of this thesis as: 
1. National preparedness and resilience.  
2. Cyberspace safety and security.  
3. Presumption of cyber-physical systems.  
This chapter answers the research sub-question: what are the intersections 
between the homeland security enterprise and public works? Within each area of 
intersection, this chapter analyzes literature and efforts put forth by the HSE, public 
works, and other sources supportive of shared mission spaces. The describe-compare-
relate method is used as the method of analysis within this chapter. The results of the 
analysis are used to further identify the shared mission spaces between the HSE and 
public works and to determine whether there is an adequate or inadequate relationship 
between the two institutions. The areas of intersection that reflect a strong relationship 
with either literature or effort as evidence are categorized as adequate. The areas of 
intersection that do not reflect a strong relationship, as evidenced through a lack of 
literature or efforts, are categorized as inadequate. The third level of relationship is 
mediocre. This status is assigned when there is neither a significantly strong nor weak 
relationship between the institutions and if there are valid, defendable arguments for both 
sides. Within the final chapter, the intersecting areas that reflect inadequacy are used to 
propose recommendations for the future to strengthen the relationship between the HSE 
and public works. 
A. NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE 
National preparedness and resilience is the first area of intersection for analysis. 
1. Describe / Compare / Relate 
This section more narrowly focuses on three key areas of national preparedness 
and resilience: critical infrastructure, financial commitment, and lastly through disaster 
recovery efforts. These three key areas were selected because of the historic relevance 
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that each topic has had over time to public works. Additionally, the HSE has vested 
interest in each of the topics. This creates a shared mission space for both. 
2. Critical Infrastructure 
Throughout history, critical infrastructure has been a function of public works 
institutions. This still primarily remains the case in terms of the design and construction 
of physical structures, along with maintenance, ownership, and daily operations. 
However, with the HSE now included in the mix, a vested interest and concern for 
critical infrastructure has grown outside of the traditional boundaries and includes other 
meanings of infrastructure. For example, critical infrastructure as identified from DHS 
is:.  
… the backbone of our nation’s economy, security and health. We know it 
as the power we use in our homes, the water we drink, the transportation 
that moves us, and the communication systems we rely on to stay in touch 
with friends and family. Critical infrastructure are the assets, systems, and 
networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that 
their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or 
any combination thereof.69 
The HSE has placed a considerable emphasis on critical infrastructure through 
supporting literature and policy. DHS is a driving force in furthering homeland security 
efforts. Because of this, the literature that originates from this institution is recognized as 
important. One of the primary HSE documents is the Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review that addresses in generality some of the large topics within the HSE.70 National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.71 
Additionally, the Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21). Each document references 
                                                 
69U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “What Is Critical Infrastructure?” 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure. 
70 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.  
71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 
2013, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/National-Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-
508.pdf, 10, 35.    
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and identifies 16 unique critical infrastructure sectors.72 These sectors have been 
established through DHS, where it “advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain 
secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure.”73 In addition to the 16 unique 
sectors of critical infrastructure, all-hazards plans have been developed for each of the 
critical infrastructure sectors through annexes. Annexes are broad policy guidelines, 
identification of regulatory agencies, and are even applicable to local public works 
agencies. In addition, they are sector-specific plans directed toward the appropriate sector 
specific agencies (SSA). In this case, the SSA responsibility for some infrastructure 
belongs to public works since it has the owners and operators of the assigned 
infrastructure. Some of the directly applicable annex sections that relate to public works 
are dams, some portions of emergency services, transportation systems, and water / 
wastewater systems. 
In addition to SSA annexes, there are other types of annexes from FEMA, one of 
the federal organizations structured directly under DHS. Emergency Support Function #3 
(ESF#3) is a prime example. ESF#3 is the “Public Works and Engineering Annex,” in 
which the intent is to provide “engineering-related support for the changing requirements 
of domestic incident management to include preparedness, response, and recovery 
actions.”74 Hurricane Katrina was a prime example of ESF#3 in action. This incident 
required many disciplines to come together in support of a large disaster situation; in this 
case, the USACE and even the Coast Guard were both in support of the effort. 
To further identify the HSE’s support of critical infrastructure, Presidential Policy 
Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, can be looked at 
as important literature in this respect. PPD-21 states local agencies are vital to the HSE 
and critical infrastructure because “national effort must include expertise and day-to-day 
engagement from the Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) as well as the specialized or 
                                                 
72 White House, Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) Critical Infrastructure Security and 
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support capabilities from other Federal departments and agencies, and strong 
collaboration with critical infrastructure owners and operators.”75 
The nexus of the Department of Defense (DOD) and public works efforts for 
critical infrastructure is evidenced through roadways via the Strategic Highway Network 
(STRAHNET). The STRAHNET is a portion of the larger National Highway System 
(NHS), which is an important contribution to the national defense of our nation. These 
roadways are critical components of the transportation system that provide the quick 
deployment and transport of ground supplies from military bases to other locations as 
deemed necessary by the DOD. Though it is a DOD requirement, the assurance of 
preparedness and resilience of this system is often coordinated through local agencies that 
maintain them. The HSE and public works relationship often lies with the state 
department of transportations (DOTs) but in a supportive role to the DOD. 
The United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) has a role in national 
preparedness and resilience as well. This national resource is structured under the United 
States Army. Among its many responsibilities, the USACE responds to major incidents 
and provides civil engineering duties during those events. Hurricane Katrina and 
Superstorm Sandy are classic events where these efforts are apparent. In non-incident 
mode, the USACE interacts occasionally as needed with local public works agencies for a 
variety of large scale engineering topics, such as area flood zone or levee surveys.  
A major focus of effort for the HSE is on the threat factor of terrorism. There are 
many concerns of terrorism, but those in relation to critical infrastructure are of primary 
concern for this topic. After all, DHS itself was assembled because of the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001. DHS remains strong in this claim: 
Protecting the United States from terrorism is the founding mission of the 
Department of Homeland Security. While America is stronger and more 
resilient as a result of a strengthened homeland security enterprise, threats 
from terrorism persist and continue to evolve. DHS continues to work with 
both domestic, international, and private sector partners to protect our 
                                                 
75 White House, Presidential Policy Directive 21.   
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nation against terrorist threats, while simultaneously facilitating the trade 
and travel that is essential to our economic security.76 
In comparison to the national efforts of the HSE primarily evidenced through 
literature, local public works agencies show stronger action and efforts than abundant 
literature. Literature is available, but primarily in the form of local policies, procedures 
and standards that uniquely affect their local area of responsibilities. These actions and 
efforts vary from state to state, county to county, and even city to city. Additionally, 
literature of local agencies is not widely distributed outside of their own agency, 
sometimes giving the appearance that local agencies are not as homeland security aware 
as national institutions. A commonality that most public works agencies offer, however, 
are similar services to their local citizens within most every city—physical evidence of 
action and efforts toward a HSE effort.  
Experience of local agencies demonstrates that the level of greatest potential 
threat to critical infrastructure is through natural disaster and not terroristic events. This is 
evidenced over the past few years in major events, such as Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm 
Sandy, and the Oso mudslide. This does not mean that public works is immune or 
disregards threat of terrorism; it simply means that more effort is placed on preparing for 
natural disaster and resilience. There certainly is a nexus to terrorism and manmade 
threats when looking at historical literature, but these occurrences are relatively rare. One 
notable attack was in 1976 on the water sector. Farmers experienced a disruption of 80 
percent of the water flow to Los Angeles because of the dynamiting a section of the 
California aqueduct. 
The HSE is most often nationally responsible and is sometimes concerned with 
worldwide responses. In contrast, local public works institutions are responsible for their 
own cities and communities or may provide mutual aid to surrounding areas when in 
need. This causes a slight disparity of perspective between the perspectives of each 
institution—broad and far or close and intimate. This may seem obvious, yet is an 
important distinction. Local agencies have a smaller command and control of their 
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organizations, even though they may report to a larger national organization, such as 
DOTs or others. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has oversight on water and 
wastewater systems. Additionally, the USACE provides engineering solutions and 
maintains oversight on many civil works programs. Bridges are controlled though local 
city or counties with national oversight from the U.S. Department of Transportation or, if 
they are over waterways, the Coast Guard. With all of these factors at play, there are 
many moving parts and many institutions involved that must be considered when 
analyzing this area of intersection.  
a. Findings 
There are slightly diverging scales of effort that both the HSE and public works 
places on preparedness and resilience through critical infrastructure. The HSE has 
understands and contributes to the national mission space to protect and support local 
critical infrastructure efforts. Local public works agencies recognize the national support, 
adhere to the chain of command within their areas of responsibility, and maintain critical 
infrastructure responsibly; however, public works remains predominately local. The 
national/local difference is evidenced in literature, duties, and efforts. Furthermore, 
though the national/local difference is slightly divergent in this respect, it is not 
necessarily considered a misalignment within the relationship of the HSE and public 
works. 
Both the HSE and public works recognize the importance of critical infrastructure 
with little debate. Through the describe-compare-relate analysis, the intersection of 
critical infrastructure within the focus of national preparedness and resilience between the 
HSE and public works demonstrates tight alignment of efforts. Therefore, the relationship 
between the HSE and public works is determined to be an adequate area of intersection. 
3. Financial Commitments 
As with many other topics, financial support and spending become a factor when 
it comes to the analysis of a situation. The relationship between the HSE and public 
works is no different. Though financial considerations may be unscientific, they often 
play into everyday decisions and operational planning. For instance, the level of financial 
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spending may reveal the level of importance of the task. As an example, the importance 
of financial spending from FEMA as it relates to importance placed on preparedness 
efforts can be seen in Figure 4, which shows a breakdown of monetary distribution as 
published within the National Preparedness Report (NPR).77 According to the report, 
FEMA alone expended $1.5 billion toward preparedness efforts and through grant 
funding in 2013. Furthermore, the top three efforts are planning, physical protective 
measures, and operational coordination. These efforts support an HSE and public works 
parallel mission space. 
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Figure 4.  Distribution of 2013 FEMA Funds for Preparedness Grants78 
The HSE routinely contributes to preparedness and resilience financially through 
monolithic public works projects and recovery efforts. This is clearly evidenced in post-
Hurricane Katrina Louisiana. Katrina was devastating, and resilience measures have been 
put in place since. In order to mitigate future disasters, the area’s expansive West Closure 
Complex project was built. In total, the project cost $14.45 billion and was primarily 
implemented through the USACE.79 The project received full congressional support with 
funding from the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS). In 
addition to levees and waterway improvements in the area, perhaps the most notable 
                                                 
78Ibid.  
79 U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers West Closure Complex, 2013, 
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Portals/56/docs/PAO/FactSheets/WCC.pdf. 
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structure is the world’s largest storm water pumping station, at a cost of $1 billion 
alone.80 
Another major disaster was Superstorm Sandy for which the estimate of total 
damage costs was $50billion.81 One of the many results of Sandy has been a proposed 
change of engineering designs in terms of electrical panel locations. Many of the vital 
panels are located underground, and once from the storm water contacted them, the 
equipment became useless. The proposal is to move the panels to upper levels and away 
from water if the area were to flood again. Consolidated Edison (Con Ed), which is New 
York’s main power distributor, estimates the expense would be in the range of $800 
million alone for its equipment.82 As other facilities would also require the changes, 
Governor Cuomo asked for $2.7 billion for additional improvements.83 This is important 
because there is be a tradeoff between preparedness and resilience, and the costs must be 
addressed. Fortunately, the risk of major flooding as experienced in Sandy does not occur 
often. For now, the issue is at a standstill, and there has yet to be a common standard 
published that addresses this issue in a unified way. 
It is evident the transportation network systems are important for the HSE and 
sustained by public works agencies of various types; however, they are also funded from 
local levels. In California alone, for example, the financial investment in transportations 
systems demonstrates the monumental scope by both the HSE and public works. 
According to State of California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS):.  
California’s transportation network receives funding from federal, state, 
local governments, and private investments. Federal, state, and local 
revenues are collected through: 1) user fees, 2) property access charges, 
and 3) subsidies. Regional and local governments provide approximately 
49% in transportation funding, whereas, the state provides 27% and the 
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federal government provides 24%. The transportation network received 
approximately $27 billion for Fiscal Year 2013–14.84 
This report, as a one example of funding sources, demonstrates that the majority of 
funding is local. The federal government invests significantly, but not the same level as 
the locals. The lower percentage provided by federal money does not indicate it is 
unwillingness to invest; it simply means federal funds are distributed among many states 
and many projects. One of the mechanisms of funding is provided through the Highway 
Trust Fund. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Highway Trust 
Fund is expected to run out of funding, causing a shortfall by the end of fiscal year 
2015.85 This shortfall may cause further delay and infrastructure failure because of 
roadway maintenance.  
Deteriorating public works critical infrastructure is evident throughout the United 
States. Areas that do not often receive as much attention are “behind-the-scene” 
functions, such as sewer plants or water distribution systems. Although it may not receive 
as much public attention as other critical infrastructure, public works spends it local 
budgets toward upgrades, manpower, and daily operations of facilities that serve its 
communities in out of the public’s eye. One example is found in Riverside, California. 
The Riverside public works department has invested in a $225 million wastewater 
treatment facility upgrade to an existing facility that serves nearly 800,000 citizens. This 
project was not funded through the HSE but the city, which recognized the importance of 
this facility to the overall benefit and health of the city and the worth of the multimillion 
dollar investment. In this case, preparation and resilience for future expansion is 
important for the department, and ultimately contributes to the HSE in these ways. 
Bridges are often placed in the spotlight as an area of public concern. They are 
constantly in the public’s sights because they are used by millions of drivers every day 
throughout the nation. When bridge failures occur, they become national news. In terms 
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of practicality, they cause traffic delays, hamper emergency responders, and even can 
cause death through failure. One example is the I-35W (Bridge 9340) Minnesota over 
Mississippi River that failed in 2006 during rebuild. Another is the I-5 Skagin River 
Bridge in Washington State in 2013. This bridge collapse was from a delivery truck that 
struck a main supportive beam that sent the entire portion of the bridge down. Though 
neither the Minnesota nor the Washington incidents was directly caused solely by 
deterioration, these incidents demonstrate how valuable and vulnerable this infrastructure 
really is. 
Deterioration of infrastructure is a topic that has been addressed for many years. 
For example, every four years a report card for America’s infrastructure is produced by 
the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in coordination with other institutions. 
This comprehensive report identifies infrastructure condition and then provides an overall 
assessment—or “grade”—on these assets throughout the nation. In 2005, public works 
infrastructure at that time was given a rating of D+, primarily because of because of 
structural deficiency concerns. The most recent release is from 2013, where the rating 
still remains at a D+. A grade of D+ categorizes them as structurally deficient according 
to design criteria. There is evidence that public works thinks there should be 
improvements. Moreover, there is evidence that the HSE is in agreement that work needs 
to be done. The mission space between the HSE and public works is aligned in this area, 
but some infrastructure areas get addressed, and others do not. Why is this area that is 
agreed upon as a problem not getting resolved? Decisions may be based upon political 
spending on infrastructure projects, rather than on actual need. The political debate, 
though unresolved, is a topic for other research. 
There is a known estimated cost to retrofit the identified areas of infrastructure 
that are considered structurally deficient. That cost is estimated to be $3.6 trillion to bring 
the rating to a satisfactory level by 2020. This financial investment will help prepare the 
nation and citizens for future traffic growth, as well as offer general safety of the 
infrastructure. However, in spite of poor structural ratings, only a few bridges out of 
many will receive financial backing for retrofit needs. 
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a. Findings 
Both the HSE and local public works institutions have significant budgets. There 
are parallel mission spaces in some spending areas, such as FEMA money in support of 
preparedness and resilience through planning, physical protection measures, and 
operational coordination. 
The HSE and public works generally agree that there is structurally deficient 
infrastructure that needs to be addressed. In the face of disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina, the USACE coordinated a monolithic effort to build the West Closure Complex. 
This infrastructure provides preparedness for potential future flooding in this area. In 
addition, after Superstorm Sandy on the East Coast, engineers and infrastructure owners 
had a keen awareness about the physical placement of electrical equipment. The 
consciousness was regarding the need for electrical equipment to be located above 
ground or higher, rather than below ground. Stormwater filled these areas quickly, 
rending the electrical equipment useless and in need of full replacement. . Both the HSE 
and public works institutions now understand this issue, yet the initiatives have not yet 
taken full bloom. 
Analysis in this section finds the relationship between the HSE and public works 
within the area of intersection of financial commitment adequate. This finding is with 
the caveat that, though the relationship is aligned, two of the identified issues at hand 
need to be resolved. First is deteriorating infrastructure conditions that can theoretically 
be solved with a defined amount of financial investment. Second, lessons learned after 
Superstorm Sandy determined that there should be standards for electrical placement, it 
but will cost significantly. 
4. Disaster Recovery Efforts 
There are many perspectives to view the topic of national preparedness and 
resilience; however, when a disaster strikes, it always becomes a local issue first. Disaster 
recovery begins with local public works’ agencies and can then escalate to higher levels 
as needed. This is all variable depending upon the magnitude. Most often, incidents are 
handled at the local level unless there is a major disaster, as in the case of Katrina or 
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Sandy. A commonly used expression within public works institutions is “all disasters are 
local.”86 This catch-phrase is even found in official public works field manuals.87 In 
contrast to public works, the HSE emphasizes the axiom of national preparedness and 
resilience. Ultimately, both institutions focus on disaster recovery efforts.  
Public works nationwide has over 19,000 local agencies with equipment, 
personnel, and skills that remain local. Local agencies have intimate knowledge of their 
own geographic layout of cities; they understand communities and the possible effects of 
disasters better than anyone. Local agencies are often the first responders to disasters 
within their area of influence. Specifically in California, but other states as well, many 
public employees are required to serve as disaster service workers (DSW). 
Except on occasion with very severe events, local public works agencies manage 
their own disaster recover without much assistance from others. Even so, many local 
public works agencies have reciprocity functions built into their working relationships 
with surrounding cities and counties. Disaster recovery efforts may involve federal 
funding to rebuild in significant situations, but day-to-day small incidents are most often 
done through local funding, resources, and through established public/private 
partnerships. 
Public works commonly has interactions with others, such as emergency 
managers and emergency operations centers (EOCs). These institutions often subscribe to 
an all hazards approach as a business model. Since EOCs are often concerned in all 
things, public works has need to interact with them quite often but not certainly not in 
everything. The relationship found between EOCs and public works is strong, but it has 
limitations because of the varying roles that each have. The HSE is concerned with 
recovery after disasters. The National Response Framework (NRF) and 31 core 
capabilities found within it specifically focus on this.88 There are select areas within this 
framework that demonstrate the importance of public works, but not all. In addition, 
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PPD-8, National Preparedness states “systematic preparation for the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the Nation including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, 
pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.”89 Disaster recovery can include efforts as 
a result of many things, but systematic preparation is the important aspect here. In the 
past, HSE focused on recovery from terrorism and prevention of it. Over time, concerns 
have evolved to consider other threats, as stated in PPD-8.90 Historically, within the 
physical infrastructure realm, public works has been more apt to respond to natural 
disaster than manmade threats.  
Requirements that impact public works originate from many areas: DHS, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA), 
and many others. However, in terms of disaster recovery efforts, public works relies on 
generations of practical experience coupled with more recent technically developed 
skills. Since public works has been an established discipline for generations, there is a 
certain expectation of core competency available from this group. Practical field 
knowledge within each respective community and in each widely different city plays into 
this. In addition, cyber skills have become more critical and sought after. Though public 
works’ personnel are often knowledgeable in standard practices, such as the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), other first responders take the lead and public 
works performs the field work. With many skills in public works’ toolboxes, full 
advantage should be taken of this resource. 
Due to the industrial nature of public works agencies, there are other unique skills 
that public works offers. Some of these skills include certifications in confined space, 
chemical awareness through programs like hazardous waste operations and emergency 
response (HAZWOPR). HAZWOPR is a required by Occupational Safety and Health 
Agency (OSHA) when dealing with hazardous cleanup or if there is a possibility of 
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hazardous exposure.91 Personnel in public works, as first responders, may be exposed 
and are knowledgeable about what do to in emergency situations that arise. 
Resiliency can be achieved in a variety of ways, whether or not there is national 
mandate on public works. For example, Los Angeles has openly committed to resiliency 
through investment into a concept called resilience by design. This is not a requirement 
by any governing institutions. Mayor Garcetti implemented this plan on his own accord. 
The vision of resilience by design is focused on four basic concepts: “1) Protect the lives 
of our residents 2) Improve the capacity of the City to respond to earthquakes, 3) Prepare 
the City to recover quickly from earthquakes 4) Protect the economy of the City and all 
of Southern California.”92 This seems a daunting task, but it is a necessity and realistic 
threats need to be addressed in the case of Los Angeles, one of the nation’s largest cities. 
Again, the mandate is not generated from public works or any high level government 
organization, but from local leaders who see the value in resilience efforts from a public 
works perspective. 
In addition to the HSE and public works, there are other institutions that get 
involved with national preparedness and resilience. For example, the Rockefeller 
Foundation has driven a concept of city resiliency officers. It has “pioneered 100 
Resilient Cities to help more cities build resilience to the physical, social, and economic 
challenges that are a growing part of the 21st century.”93 Resilience officers report 
directly to mayors, evidencing a major initiative towards a furtherance of local support 
versus sole reliance upon nebulous national institutions. It remains to be seen what the 
effect will be with this particular program since it is so new. The initiative has barely 
begun as of this writing, but it provides an opportunity to enhance resiliency efforts in a 
new way and will most likely further the relationship between the HSE and public works 
in some ways.  
                                                 
91 United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, “OSHA FAQs: 
HAZWOPER,” accessed July 13, 2014, https://www.osha.gov/html/faq-hazwoper.html. 
92 City of Los Angeles, on behalf of Mayor Eric Garcetti, “Resilience by Design,” December 8, 2014, 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/mayorofla/pages/16797/attachments/original/1420504740/
Resilience_by_Design_Full_Report_Dec_11_FINAL.pdf?1420504740. 




Pre-9/11, prior to the creation of any homeland security doctrine, public works 
had performed many of the same responsibilities as it currently does, regardless of 
national guidelines regardless of the existence of homeland security initiatives. If 
disasters are large enough, there is a fairly clear chain of command through which public 
works can escalate the issue. 
Based on analysis of disaster recovery efforts, a confident determination can be 
made regarding the relationship between the HSE and public works. Although the HSE 
focuses nationally and public works operates locally, this contrast is not a gap but a 
logical divergence. There are some local initiatives that take the concepts of recovery 
efforts further through their own resiliency planning, such as the case in Los Angeles. 
Therefore, the finding within this section reveals that the HSE and public works have an 
adequate relationship. 
5. Section Summary 
In recognizing the results of analysis within national preparedness and resilience 
within the three key areas, evidence demonstrates there are not widely divergent or 
specific areas of inadequate relationship found here. Literature and efforts show both 
institutions are geared toward similar goals, and mission spaces. In summary, the final 
results of this section are:.  
• Critical Infrastructure: Adequate 
• Financial Commitments: Adequate 
• Disaster Recovery Efforts: Adequate.  
This section has just analyzed national preparedness and resilience. Next, analysis is 
elevated to a current and continuously evolving topic: cyberspace safety and security. 
B. CYBERSPACE SAFETY AND SECURITY 
Cyberspace safety and security are hardly new concepts. In 1976, when 
computers were still growing in popularity, forward leaning analysts wrote: 
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…programmers and others in sensitive electronic data processing (E.D.P.) 
jobs are potentially the most dangerous people in the world. When 
technology was fairly new there were some that understood the dangers of 
technology. But there are obviously benefits as well.94 
In the same manner as in the previous section, this research for this section will 
also utilize the describe-compare-relate analysis method to reveal the level of relationship 
found between HSE and public works institutions within the intersection of cyberspace 
safety and security. According to a Senate intelligence report, cyber attacks are “one of 
the top threat concerns facing our nation as a whole.”95 
1. Describe / Compare / Relate 
This section more narrowly focuses on three key areas of cyberspace safety and 
security. The key areas are unique concern for threats, policies and procedures, and real-
time situational awareness. The HSE is keenly aware of the growing use of cyberspace 
and the potential damage that can be caused by cyberspace if used nefariously; however, 
what is less common is public works’ role within the cyberspace arena. For these reasons, 
the areas were specifically selected to be used as areas of analysis. 
2. Unique Concern for Threats 
…hackers had struck an unnamed steel mill in Germany. They did so by 
manipulating and disrupting control systems to such a degree that a blast 
furnace could not be properly shut down, resulting in ‘massive’—though 
unspecified—damage.96 
Nuclear centrifuges were electronically attacked and destroyed in Iraq in 
2010.They were operating under what was thought to be highly controlled industrial 
control systems (ICS), yet they were still targeted, attacked, and physically damaged. 
While consumers may view cyber threats as credit card hacks of Home Depot, Target, 
banking systems, or personal information, public works worries about cyberspace as it 
relates to unique areas of responsibility through the use industrial engineered systems. 
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The damaged equipment previously described in Iraq and Germany was caused 
by the Stuxnet worm. The Stuxnet is a cyber attack model that can greatly affect both the 
HSE and public works simultaneously. In Germany, the simple blast furnace on the steel 
mill’s SCADA network system was destroyed via commands sent through the network to 
that equipment. In Iraq, expensive centrifuges spinning nuclear materials were destroyed. 
There was no impact on American citizens, but that does not negate the fact that SCADA 
systems were compromised and destroyed. Public works heavily relies upon SCADA and 
ICS systems to operate critical infrastructure throughout the entire United States. 
Evidence is beginning to show that SCADA command and control capabilities are 
factual, vulnerable, and can cause real damage. These risks will most likely increase in 
the future. Both of these relatively minor infractions offer a glimpse into the potential of 
future breaches on our nation’s critical infrastructure. According to an article on CBS 
News:.  
In 2013, United States intelligence agencies have uncovered a data breach 
that targeted and compromised the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 
National Inventory of Dams (NID) starting back in January. 
The database itself contains classified information on vulnerabilities on 
8,100 dams across the United States, including rankings of hazard levels 
for each dam.97 
Use of this database has not been made available for review due to the fact that it 
contains confidential data with details of critical infrastructure not appropriate for public 
access. So far, no reported consequential events have occurred because of this breach, but 
the events do cause concern about the danger of future attacks on the critical 
infrastructure sector.  
Cyberspace safety and security for public works moves from the traditional 
definition of cyberspace into less understood areas of operation, known as industrial 
control systems (ICS), and distributed control systems (DCS). These systems include 
engineering controls through the use of SCADA systems. The cyber systems are now 
                                                 




vastly inter-connected between physical and electronic infrastructure. ICS and SCADA 
attacks are beginning to blur the lines between cyberspace and physical environments 
through Internet connectivity (this concept is more clearly addressed later in the analysis 
chapter for cyber-physical systems). Though SCADA and ICS type attacks have been 
performed and observed, the assault does not generate the same publicity as attacks 
performed on the consumer market. The breaches at Target and Home Depot were much 
more visible, perhaps because of the direct financial effect on consumers. Public works 
operates facilities that are mainly out of the public’s view, and operate in systems that are 
not commonly well understood. Cyberspace attacks are being described by many as a 
“new era of warfare;” the threat is real, the United States has experienced it already and 
has the potential to worsen.98 ICS-CERT shows the number of intrusions on some of the 
common public works infrastructure, such as water, power, and buildings. Power 
continues to be targeted most often. Out of 245 attacks reported to ICS-CERT, 79 were 
on the energy sector.99 
Unique concerns for threats come from the energy industry and the use of Smart 
Grid technology. Smart grids harness the power of interconnected systems, as 
demonstrated through ICS and SCADA systems. The consequences from information 
breaches are a realistic concern. However, the consequences from attacks on industrial 
systems can be physically damaging and have dire consequences. For example, the 
Northeast Blackout Incident of 2003 affected 30 million citizens, caused $6 billion in 
damages, and brought 11 human deaths.100 The outage was ultimately determined to be 
caused by lack of SCADA monitoring, lack of communication among agencies, and even 
lack of training.101 Though this incident was not an intentional attack on the energy 
sector, it demonstrated that the resulting physical damage from SCADA systems can be 
terrible. 
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The nuclear power industry also presents a unique concern with cyberspace. In 
1979, the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear incident in Maryland occurred. Similar to the 
Northeast Blackout, this was not an intentional attack or cyber attack on a system. It is 
also rarely mentioned within the SCADA or ICS communities or in conjunction with 
modern technology concepts. However, conceptually this example can be used to 
demonstrate the effects of SCADA systems not performing correctly. In the era of 
rudimentary SCADA-like systems of the 1970s, the SCADA system at TMI was 
comprised of lights on a switchboard. Because of this, operators were not alerted of an 
issue in the reactor. Could this be categorized as an early form of SCADA related 
incident? According to the report,.  
The valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper levels, but it 
became stuck open. Instruments in the control room, however, indicated to 
the plant staff that the valve was closed. As a result, the plant staff was 
unaware that cooling water was pouring out of the stuck-open valve.102 
Because of the meltdown at TMI, sweeping policy changes occurred in the 
nuclear industry. Higher security measures were put into place, technical concerns were 
raised, and specialized nuclear staff labor training was increased. These same standards 
have not trickled into all of the other ICS environments. 
In addition to the nuclear industry, there are other critical infrastructure sectors 
that should be considered in cyberspace discussions. One of these sectors is 
transportation. Public transportation—buses, planes, rails, automobiles—is considered 
one of our nation’s critical infrastructures and is a key component of our society. Many of 
these systems are becoming integrated with automatic system controls through the use of 
SCADA systems. For example, in the wreck of a commuter train in Pennsylvania in May 
of 2015, the train had exceeded the speed limit by more than double at the time of the 
crash. The wreck could have been prevented through SCADA monitored positive train 
control (PTC).103 PTC is now a widely addressed topic by the National Transportation 
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Safety Board (NTSB) and is becoming a requirement of some transportation system 
going forward. This technology was already a congressional mandate from 2008 after a 
Metrolink train accident in Los Angeles of that year that killed 25 passengers. Though 
PTC is mandated for adoption by December of 2015, nationwide deployment has not 
been met, primarily because of high costs to develop and deploy. It has been estimated 
PTC may cost up to $10 billion nationwide for all rail companies to implement.104 
Lawmakers have proposed extending this mandate to 2020 for this reason.  
Without further electronic controls and cyberspace security, transportation has the 
potential to affect cities in immense ways. One of the ways can be found in a piece of 
inconspicuous equipment—the common traffic signal. Major metropolitan areas 
commonly utilize traffic management centers (TMCs). TMCs monitor and maintain a 
safe, consistent flow of traffic within larger cities through manipulation of intersection 
stop/go lights. If compromised, traffic could become snarled, and emergency services 
could be impeded. In 2006, the city of Los Angeles experienced a breach of its traffic 
signal system. Though striking union engineers were the cause, consequences were 
nonetheless shocking. The attackers selected key intersections to manipulate, including 
Los Angeles Airport, causing major automobile traffic backup for several days.105 This 
incident provides evidence that even seemingly harmless systems can be hacked. 
Theoretically, there are other cyber attacks that can be carried out on traffic systems. The 
use of copper induction loops, or light sensors, is a common signal technology used at 
many intersections. These signals are sent back to the TMC’s ICS via unencrypted data. 
The vulnerability in data feedback from the intersection to the TMC that has been hacked 
could send attack commands back to the primary network.106 Affected systems can cause 
deterrence of emergency service vehicle access, traffic backup, collisions, death, or 
system wide outages. The possibilities are frightening, yet not fully addressed. The 
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National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (NCUTCD) typically guides 
many of the traffic control practices and standards, but there does not seem to be much, if 
any, homeland security related data to address these systems. 
The examples provided show cyberspace, specifically the unique threats on public 
works assets, are real and can pose serious consequences if systems are not safeguarded 
and secured. One of the challenges in protecting unique systems in critical infrastructure 
environments can be the human factor. SCADA personnel must have a unique 
understanding of industrial equipment, coupled with the unique skill-set of computer 
systems and programming, and also an understanding of process control. Electrical and 
mechanical experience coupled with standard information technology knowledge in 
managing computer-to-equipment translation between cyber and physical is a difficult 
skill to find. Additionally, there is no standardization within the industry; most often 
configurations of the ICS are left to the local agency to maintain. This leads to the use of 
security by obscurity concept.107 This is unwise and not an effective method of ICS cyber 
security. 
a. Findings 
Through analysis in this section, the findings regarding unique threats are cause 
for concern because of a mismatched use of resources. Though there is foundationally a 
common mission space between the HSE and public works regarding ICS and SCADA 
systems, the two remain somewhat mismatched in relation to one another. First, the HSE 
recognizes the need for cyberspace security, yet government systems continue to get 
hacked, losing important data such as the USACE dam database. Infrastructure is one of 
the core elements of our society, yet not all of it is cyber protected in a unified way. 
Aside from the energy and nuclear sectors, there have not been sweeping changes within 
the other sectors. Policies and procedures are covered in the next section, but this 
demonstrates there are many commonalities that thread between many of the topics. 
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Ultimately, this section has revealed the relationship to be both adequate and inadequate 
resulting in a mediocre relationship between the HSE and public works. 
3. Policies and Procedures 
In 1979, the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear facility in Maryland experienced a 
partial meltdown of the nuclear reactor core 2 (TMI-2). It was the worst nuclear incident 
the United States had experienced. In 2003, the energy sector experienced the Northeast 
Blackout that affected 50 million people, caused 11 deaths, and resulted in $6 billion in 
damages.  
Both of these incidents caused sweeping changes in their respective fields in 
terms of policies and procedures. Prior to TMI-2, the nuclear industry did not have many 
enforceable policies. As a result of this deficiency, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) developed additional criteria for the industry. The second incident, 
the 2003 Northeast Blackout, caused a major shift in policy. Changes were implemented 
within the energy sector in an attempt to eliminate another blackout situation. The effects 
were so severe in fact that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was born, which caused a 
tremendous amount of new oversight.  
Recently, stricter policy and regulatory practices have become more common 
within individual industries. Unfortunately, these changes were reactive to major 
incidents. Instead of waiting to see what major incident may happen next before 
implementing sweeping changes, proactive effort should be a priority for policy makers. 
The power and nuclear industries are both good examples of policy and guidelines that 
are now fairly well regulated in regard to operations, procedures, and cyberspace policy. 
Part of the justification for implementing cyberspace controls within these industries is 
because of the changing environments and significance placed on energy as evidenced 
previously.  
Energy distribution utilizes power grids that operate throughout the U.S. These 
power grids are operated via electronically connected Smart grid systems. Smart grid 
systems allow staff to utilize electronic monitoring and controls of field assets. This helps 
to quickly identify areas that may have issues or may indicate to engineers that operations 
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are running well. Smart grids are heavily controlled by regulatory commissions, 
engineering agencies, and others. Some of the Smart Grid requirements come from 
institutions such as the National Energy Regulatory Commission-Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (NERC-CIP), which mandates federal requirements within this 
environment.108 NERC is considered the electric reliability organization (ERO) for North 
America, and it is subject to oversight by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC).  
The energy sector additionally adheres to the Energy Policy Act of 2005. This 
was primarily written to ensure that another Northeast Blackout incident of 2003 does not 
occur again. Prior to that power outage, industry reliability standards were only 
voluntary. After that event, standards became mandatory and legally enforceable. FERC 
places required cyber regulations on the industry that helps to ensure safety and health of 
the electrical grid. Part of the NERC-CIP reliability standards requires “users, owners, 
and operators of the bulk-power system to comply with specific requirements to 
safeguard critical cyber assets.”109 
Likewise, the nuclear industry has become further integrated into cyberspace and 
is highly regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Primarily 
because of the TMI-2 incident, the NRC requires facilities to follow strict adherence to 
industry guidelines. From the limited publicly available literature regarding the nuclear 
facilities, it appears that facilities are often operated on separated networks from the 
outside world of the Internet. There are fairly consistent modes of operation from one 
facility to the next as the NRC is an agency that consistently applies the same rules to 
each facility that supplies nuclear power. The NRC has imposed very strict guidelines on 
operations due to the potential for extreme consequences. As it seems to happen often, 
one terrible event in history causes strict guidelines to be put in place in reaction. For the 
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nuclear industry, some of the current guidelines stemmed from the TMI-2 reactor disaster 
in Maryland. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Its aftermath brought about sweeping changes involving emergency 
response planning, reactor operator training, human factors engineering, 
radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant 
operations. It also caused the NRC to tighten and heighten its regulatory 
oversight. All of these changes significantly enhanced U.S. reactor 
safety.110 
The HSE does have an organization that offers cyberspace guidelines and 
response assistance within ICS and SCADA, called the Industrial Control Systems-
Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT). This organization assists both public 
and private industries in technology matters at this scale. It offers numerous guidelines 
and best practices, but it does not place mandatory policies or guidelines for any 
organization. The scope of work focuses in literature and in response to incidents. 
In comparison local agency governance for cyberspace standards and guidelines 
that federal agencies must abide by are quite different. As described before, local 
agencies, with few exceptions, have little to no enforceable guidelines for cyberspace 
security. Federal systems commonly operate under federal law with guidelines under the 
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA).111 The director of the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has oversight authority with respect to agency 
information security policies and practices. In addition, FISMA authorizes the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to provide technical assistance to agencies and 
inspectors general, including testing information security controls and procedures. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is under the 
responsibility of the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST produces many guidelines, 
and in relation to policy and procedures, it has developed Special Publication 800–82, the 
Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security.112 In addition, NIST offers Federal 
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Information Processing Standards (FIPS), which recommend (but not requires) that 
minimum cyberspace standards should be adhered to when there are no other 
standards.113 FIPS has the potential for great importance for SCADA and ICS systems, 
where a security concept referred to in the industry as “security by obscurity.” It is a 
generally accepted policy within the industry but lacks any standardization. 
Essentially, local public works agencies have mixed cyberspace policies. These 
policies and procedures remain local, but have some industry proponents such as the 
APWA, IEEE, and ACSE to offer best practices. There is no one standardized method 
within the industry regarding cyberspace in these environment. This would be an ideal 
environment for FIPS to be implemented. According to NIST, “NIST develops FIPS 
when there are compelling Federal government requirements such as for security and 
interoperability and there are no acceptable industry standards or solutions.”114 The 
security through obscurity philosophy has been completely debunked by security 
organizations. The private sector has addressed this theory, with organizations such as 
McAfee, Info-Security, and other software security-related private organizations.  
The critical infrastructure industries are in denial about the extent of their 
cyber vulnerabilities and the need to take urgent efforts to remedy them, 
says Stephen Flynn, co-director of Northeastern University’s George J. 
Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security in Burlington, Mass.  
‘We are in a transition phase where these sectors are ignorant or in denial 
about the security problems,’ Flynn tells Infosecurity. 
‘The cyber risk is now so pervasive that everybody should be taking steps 
to manage the risk…Any determined adversary can get access to this 
information and become skilled at it with just what is available right now,’ 
Flynn warns.115 
There has been an increase in high profile cyber attacks. For example, Sony 
Pictures data networks were disabled, retailers Target and Home Depot’s credit card 
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systems were breached, and even the federal government Office of Personnel and 
Management (OPM) had millions of federal employees’ personal data stolen. Because 
there are thousands of public works institutions, there is great potential for large threats 
of high magnitude in a similar fashion. This can apply to local public works infrastructure 
facilities and the various processes attached to each of them. Interconnected systems are 
frequently found within public works systems, where fundamental services may shut 
down (e.g., sewer treatment plants may incur overflows, nuclear facilities may meltdown, 
water treatment may get under dosed or overdosed with chemicals). The potential risks 
are innumerable. 
In the past, public works has traditionally been identified as an industrial, labor 
intensive discipline. Cyberspace has become increasingly integrated within its 
responsibilities, yet personnel within public works agencies are not often appropriately 
trained in cyberspace security. As technology becomes even more integrated throughout 
many processes, the need has grown. Public works performs duties in support of 
homeland security requirements, yet there are not consistent requirements placed on these 
systems. Should public works have dedicated cyber professionals? 
Regulations can make progress slower and add expenses to industries that are 
affected by them. Nonetheless, there are potential consequences and dire effects of not 
having regulation. A prime example is evidenced through the commuter train derailment 
in Pennsylvania in April of this year.  
On Tuesday, the House passed a transportation spending bill that includes 
$9 million for Amtrak to install inward-facing cameras in locomotive 
cabs. Five years ago, the NTSB recommended the Federal Railroad 
Administration require railroads install the cameras so that investigators 
have a video and sound recording of what was going inside the cab in the 
event of an accidents. 
However, regulators didn’t convene an industry-labor advisory committee 
to work on possible regulations until last year. The committee has been 
unable to reach a consensus, and the railroad administration has said it will 
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pursue regulations without the committee’s endorsement. However, it 
could be years before regulations are proposed and then made final.116 
Public works civil engineering policies and procedures at local levels are 
relatively robust when it comes to physical infrastructure design and construction. For 
example, frequently, the Greenbook is used with strict adherence to guidelines that 
address building codes and general construction designs.117 Additionally, many of the 
tradecraft in the construction industry has to adhere to National Fire Protection Agency 
(NFPA) guidelines. Moreover, public works will refer to the Greenbook for construction 
standards, and the energy sector adheres to NERC-CIP standards. The contributions from 
the HSE regarding public works assets really only address high level strategies, and there 
is only a spattering of controls by governing agencies. However, there is not a strict 
widely accepted guideline or Greenbook that addresses cyberspace standards 
comprehensively. 
a. Findings 
The result in this section identifies an area of intersection that contains both 
adequate and inadequate relationships between the HSE and public works. An adequate 
relationship is found in the nuclear and energy sectors. Big events such as TMI and the 
Northeast Blackout caused sweeping regulatory changes. The energy Smart Grid has 
regulatory oversight through NERC-CIP and the energy regulatory commission. Public 
works has similar environments as the energy sector, in terms of industrial systems, but 
the same amount of oversight is not placed on the industry. NIST and public works’ 
associations provide guidelines and best practices, such as the Greenbook, but regulations 
are determined individually from state to state. Some guided by the NFPA, and some are 
not. The primary differences are oversight authorities that either have authoritative 
powers over their industries, and those that primarily provide guidance, best methods, 
and practices. 
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Through analysis, this section has revealed the relationship to be both adequate 
and inadequate causing a mediocre relationship to exist between the HSE and public 
works. 
4. Real-Time Situational Awareness 
In May 2015, 50,000 gallons of oil spilled from a pipeline in Santa Barbara 
County. Cleanup costs have risen to $62 million and have affected the environment in 
many ways. The Federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (at the 
time of this writing) has determined that massive corrosion on the pipeline may be 
partially at fault.118 September of 2010, San Bruno, California experienced a gas pipeline 
explosion in the middle of a neighborhood killing eight and leveling 35 homes. 
According to an article in the San Jose Mercury News, “Federal regulators sharply 
criticized how the PUC [Public Utility Commission] monitored the utility before the 
blast.”119 
Electronic real-time situational awareness has become a need more than ever and 
in doing so, may prevent future incidents. This need is demonstrated from the HSE 
through the QHSR. Public works has been electronically monitoring infrastructure for a 
very long time, but it can potentially expand these endeavors into other areas of interest. 
The electronic means that this can be accomplished is through further uses of sensor 
systems. Sensors are electronic equipment interconnected to SCADA systems, relaying 
data back to centralized servers. Real examples can be evidenced in examples such as 
sewer system monitoring, water line pressure, speed sensors on commuter trains, vehicle 
tracking, speed sensing, vibration analysis, temperature, and flow rates. 
Homeland security professionals have recognized and experienced many risks in 
the traditional sense of cyberspace, but it is unclear if they truly understand the additional 
perspective that public works offers in this area or have experienced the full benefits of 
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SCADA systems. Internally, public works offers real-time situational awareness to 
operators frequently through internal mechanisms. Near real-time monitoring has become 
a broad goal by HSE professionals, but is often implemented by public works. The need 
for this data helps to provide situational awareness necessary in order to make more 
informed decisions to ensure the public’s safety. It may also serve as preparedness in 
situations such as early warning systems for earthquake, flood threats, and more. This 
technology has already been successfully used for years within public works through 
SCADA and ICS systems.  
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) is focuses on critical infrastructure 
security and resilience. It calls for two areas of focus: physical infrastructure and 
cyberspace infrastructure. One of the many components of PPD-21, which can be loosely 
related to public works’ capabilities: 
…integration and analysis function shall support DHS’s ability to 
maintain and share, as a common Federal service, a near real-time 
situational awareness capability for critical infrastructure that includes 
actionable information about imminent threats, significant trends, and 
awareness of incidents that may affect critical infrastructure.120 
The HSE has become keenly aware of the need for near real-time situational awareness of 
infrastructure. Real-time monitoring is important for day-to-day operations at local 
physical infrastructure facilities and for equipment optimization, forecasting, or modeling 
of various scenarios relating to mechanical and electrical equipment within. These 
facilities may include, but are not limited to, dams, sewer systems, water distribution 
facilities, or drawbridges. One hurdle found between each of the named infrastructure 
types is that they are all controlled in varying manners by divergent institutions; they do 
not all work the same. Dams are typically under the responsibility of the USACE, water 
distribution and sewer are under the Environmental Protection Agency, and drawbridges 
are regulated and are under jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard Bridge 
                                                 
120 White House, Presidential Policy Directive 21.   
 71 
Administration.121 A commonality between all of these examples should be real-time 
monitoring capabilities that apply to each equally.  
Other known areas that benefit from real-time monitoring are early warning 
earthquake systems. This is especially true in California and can be better seen in Japan’s 
preparedness systems. CalTech and the U.S. Geological Society (USGS) have been 
working on an early warning system in California. This system has been installed since 
2012. Japan has been working on similar systems for many years long before 2012 so its 
systems are more robust. Essentially, there are multiple sensors placed strategically 
throughout the regions where monitoring is desired. Each of these sensor systems 
monitors for certain conditions. Sensors are a key component of cyberspace systems for 
public works infrastructure, serving as their mechanism of intelligence collection. 
Sensors are becoming even a greater necessity within many processes, which are further 
described in the third point of intersection, cyber-physical.  
New and recurring issues continue to crop up and turn into larger issues, for 
example, drought conditions in California and the need for conservation of water. A 
challenge that comes with an issue as complex as drought may be solved through further 
use of large sensor systems. Sometimes water jurisdictions have the desire to identify 
those who waste water within their areas of responsibility, but currently there are not 
many options aside from sending human personnel to manually investigate suspected 
wasters. This challenge could be fixed if additional sensor networks are utilized. There 
are some utility companies already monitoring conditions via electronic means. The gas 
companies have capabilities to monitor residential meters, but they have not implemented 
any type of electronic monitoring of underground lines. This monitoring is important as 
underground monitoring could have prevented the San Bruno gas line explosion.  
a. Findings 
Within this section, which analyzed real-time situational awareness, it is apparent 
that there are areas of both adequacy and inadequacy in the relationship between the HSE 
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and public works. There are adequate capabilities within public works to further enhance 
sensor networks, through the use of skilled personnel and technology. The HSE desires 
real-time situational awareness, but there have not been any tangible efforts toward the 
achievement of this goal. This may be due to lack of mandated requirement or 
regulations, or it may be that the HSE simply does not realize the full capabilities of 
public works institutions. Ultimately, real-time situational awareness is not being utilized 
to the fullest extent possible. Through analysis, this section has revealed the relationship 
between the HSE and public works a mediocre.  
5. Section Summary 
In recognition of the results of analysis within cyberspace safety and security 
within the three key areas, evidence demonstrates a mixed relationship. Some shared 
mission spaces lacking a strong relationship, and other areas are adequate. In summary, 
the final results of this section are:.  
• Unique concern for threat: Mediocre 
• Policies and procedures: Mediocre 
• Real-time situational awareness: Mediocre 
This section has analyzed cyberspace safety and security. Next, analysis is elevated to 
the emergent presumption of cyber-physical systems. 
C. PRESUMPTION OF CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
The prior sections analyzed national preparedness and resilience, specifically as 
relates to critical infrastructure, financial, and disaster recovery efforts. It also analyzed 
cyberspace safety and security as relates to unique concerns for threats, policies, and 
procedures and the need for real-time situational awareness. In a culmination of many of 
these concepts, cyber-physical systems (CPS) begin to become evident. CPS will take us 
beyond all of the previously analyzed intersections and into an interconnected world that 
the United States has not yet fully realized, especially in relation to public works. 
Infrastructure intertwined with cyberspace moves the analysis concepts into a 
presumptive mindset. The presumption in this scenario is based on current knowledge of 
CPS but is proposing a possible future relationship between the HSE and public works in 
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this area of intersection. The concept of industrial control systems (ICS) is expanded. 
Traditional SCADA systems are stretched and challenged in new ways. CPS goes beyond 
and into the Internet of things (IoT). The IoT is coming to realization, and is quickly 
becoming the Internet of everything (IoE). Proponents of CPS believe that most anything 
can be “sensortized.” There is also an outlook that says “what can be connected, will be 
connected.”122 
1. Describe / Compare / Relate 
The previous two sections focused on three key areas. This section more narrowly 
focuses on only one key area that places some presumptions on an emergent topic—
cyber-physical systems. This area was selected because there are potential implications 
for both the HSE and public works that must be prepared for in the future 
2. In Preparation of Cyber-Physical Systems 
Cyber-physical can be described succinctly through this definition: 
Cyber-Physical Systems or ‘smart’ systems are co-engineered interacting 
networks of physical and computational components. These systems will 
provide the foundation of our critical infrastructure, form the basis of 
emerging and future smart services, and improve our quality of life in 
many areas. Cyber-physical systems will bring advances in personalized 
health care, emergency response, traffic flow management, and electric 
power generation and delivery, as well as in many other areas now just 
being envisioned. Other phrases that you might hear when discussing 
these and related CPS technologies include: Internet of Things (IoT), 
Industrial Internet, Smart Cities, Smart Grid, ‘Smart’ Anything (e.g., Cars, 
Buildings, Homes, Manufacturing, Hospitals, Appliances)123 
The HSE has recognized cyber-physical as a real, tangible object that must be addressed 
in preparation of cyber-physical systems. This is demonstrated in the QHSR, GAO 
documents, and in DHS’s Science and Technology Division (S&T). S&T uses the 
following description of cyber-physical, with a warning of inherent vulnerability warning 
written within it:.  
                                                 
122 Morgan, “A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things.’”  
123 National Institute Standards and Technology, “Cyber-Physical Systems Welcome Page,” accessed 
July 12, 2015, http://www.nist.gov/cps/. 
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With advances in technology, our nation has become more reliant on cyber 
physical systems—systems in which computer networks control physical 
systems. Cyber physical systems offer greater efficiencies through reduced 
manpower, faster responsiveness and other capabilities. However, the 
systems are also more vulnerable to cyberattacks. 
Cyber physical systems are commonly used in the everyday operations of 
utilities and they also play a role in a number of other critical 
infrastructures—from the traffic lights on street corners to the systems 
controlling machinery. Cyber physical systems also include GPS-based 
technologies, which have virtually replaced paper maps in recent years. It 
is important that these networks are protected, secure and able to run 
smoothly despite unwanted interference by external forces or 
conditions.124 
Additionally, the National Cyberspace Strategy addresses cyber and physical assets 
through this definition: 
Our Nation’s critical infrastructures consist of the physical and cyber assets of 
public and private institutions in several sectors: agriculture, food, water, public 
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and 
telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and 
hazardous materials, and postal and shipping. Cyberspace is the nervous system of 
these infrastructures—the control system of our country.125 
Aside from the HSE, there are other initiatives and organizations that address the concept 
of cyber-physical. According to the literature surrounding this concept, it appears that 
there is more emphasis placed on cyber-physical through academic and various other 
organizations than there is by the HSE. The SmartAmerica initiative is one of these 
initiatives. Its website states:.  
…with the goal to bring together research in Cyber-Physical Systems 
(CPS) and to combine test-beds, projects and activities from different 
sectors, such as Smart Manufacturing, Healthcare, Smart Energy, 
Intelligent Transportation and Disaster Response, to show tangible and 
                                                 
124 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, “Cyber Physical Systems,” 
accessed May 1, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/cyber-physical-systems  
125 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/national-strategy-secure-cyberspace, 1. 
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measurable benefits to the U.S. economy and the daily lives of American 
citizens.126 
SmartAmerica also describes CPS in this way: 
…a name for the combination of the Internet of Things and System 
Control. So rather than just being able to “sense” where something is, CPS 
adds the capability to control the “thing” or allow it to interact with 
physical world around it.127 
It has already been established that critical infrastructure performs an important 
role within the nation. Cyberspace itself has even become critical infrastructure as 
determined by DHS and others. In 2003, U.S. government created the first National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.128 Within this document, cyber-physical was at the 
beginning phases and rudimentarily referred to as interdependencies. As time has 
progressed, there have been growing concerns with the IoT. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has become interested because of the possible effects of consumer 
wellbeing regarding the IoT. The FTC has held workshops on the topic, which have 
addressed topics such as: 
…privacy and security issues related to increased connectivity for 
consumers, both in the home (including home automation, smart home 
appliances and connected devices), and when consumers are on the move 
(including health and fitness devices, personal devices, and cars).129 
As the world becomes highly dependent and interoperable within the Internet and 
the use of technology further increases, cyber-physical grows into even a larger issue for 
critical infrastructure operations. The American Public Works Association (APWA) 
states: 
As guardians of critical infrastructure, public works agencies value the 
security of their cyber systems, as they help run traffic management 
                                                 
126 Smart America, “About—Smart American: Presidential Innovation Fellows,” accessed May 3, 
2015, http://smartamerica.org/about/. 
127 Ibid.  
128 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 1.  
129 Federal Trade Commission, “Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World,” 
November 19, 2013, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/11/Internet-things-privacy-
security-connected-world. 
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systems, water treatment facilities, emergency services/communications, 
and other operations and services. In order for communities to be capable 
of managing emergency situations, it is imperative that public works’ 
cyber systems that control critical infrastructure are resilient to both 
terrorist threats and attacks, or natural disasters.130 
Real-time situational awareness can be realized through the use of sensors, SCADA, and 
industrial control applications all a further consequence of the IoT. The concept of IoT 
has been adopted within a few disciplines. The IoT is more commonly known then the 
next iteration of it—the IoE. The IoE can be further described by Wired Magazine:.  
IoE expands on the concept of the ‘Internet of Things’ in that it connects 
not just physical devices but quite literally everything by getting them all 
on the network. It moves beyond being a major buzzword and technology 
trend by connecting devices to one another and the Internet, and offers 
higher computing power.131 
As an example of further sensor usage, we can look at the energy sector. We 
already know there is a Smart Grid attached, but how does that translate into field 
operations? Figure 5 demonstrates just the basic number of sensors that one power pole 
can have to become part of a larger interconnected sensor system. This example is not 
that futuristic, there are already systems in place that capture most of these functions. 
                                                 
130 “Media: Protecting Water Treatment Facilities from Cyber Attacks,” American Public Works 
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Attacks. 
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Figure 5.  Transmission Line Sensor Network132 
Looking into the future holds potentially bigger issues and concerns because of 
the proliferation of technology. For example, fast approaching autonomous vehicles 
would require CPS to address public works’ processes in quite a few ways. Roadways 
that have been traditional non-technical would become a very large sensor network. 
Monitoring capabilities in this capacity could be massive and extremely integrated. 
Temperature readings, traffic flows and speed, and many more points of data will become 
available once interconnectedness occurs to a greater extent. Bridges will have additional 
sensors, such as stress monitors, dew points, traffic flow, weight sensors, and corrosion 
sensors. Some of these capabilities already exist, but expanding on a mass scale would 
still be relatively expensive to implement. An example of bridge interconnected to a 
                                                 
132 Electric Power Research Institute, Future Inspection of Overhead Transmission Lines (Palo Alto, 
CA: EPRI, 2008), http://transsensorsrobots.epri.com/pdf/Tline-Roadmap.pdf. 
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network can be seen in Figure 6. This figure depicts a real scenario, it is from one of the 
most highly sensored and electronically interconnected bridges in the world at the time, 
called the Jindo Bridge located in South Korea.  
 
Figure 6.  Jindo Bridge in South Korea133 
Public works’ critical infrastructure requires multiple cyber systems to monitor 
and operate daily modes of business. The cyber-physical aspect improves physical 
infrastructure through extensive use of sensor networks. Sensors are even more important 
with cyber-physical systems. There are a number of examples that can be reviewed to 
understand how sensors and the interconnected systems will interact. For instance, 
parking structures are already often outfitted with sensors that show open parking spaces 
to drivers. In the future, roadways will also increase in sensor usage too and be optimized 
for autonomous vehicle usage. All available road space will be measured and maintained 
electronically providing more traffic efficiencies. Street signage will be a thing of the past 
once autonomy comes into play. 
                                                 
133 University of Illinois, Information Trust Institute, “WirelessMonitoring” [image], accessed July 6, 
2015, http://iti.illinois.edu/sites/default/files/images/site/WirelessMonitoring.jpg. 
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The advancement of the Smart Grid, which is typically associated to the power 
industry, can conceptually apply to many public works systems as well. The future of 
cyber-physical systems will affect historically manual processes in ways yet 
undiscovered. As evidenced earlier, SCADA systems have evolved over the years. There 
has been a movement within the SCADA industry to bring systems that were once 
independent and monolithic and push them to evolve into highly interconnected systems 
today.  
According to another forward leaning depiction of impending future growth of 
cyber-physical systems is a potential for an interconnected future that truly brings multi-
disciplines together into one very large network. This depiction is shown in Figure 7. 
This figure also demonstrates possible future migration and interconnectedness between 
institutions and assets and public and private industries. All the while, these systems all 




Figure 7.  Future Beyond SCADA, Smart Grid Possibilities, Integrating Many 
Disciplines134 
a. Findings 
Through analysis, this section has revealed the relationship between the HSE and 
public works within the presumption of cyber-physical is inadequate. Private industry 
and academic sources coupled with plausible theory of interconnectedness brings the 
reality of cyber-physical closer through studies and emergent trends. Both the HSE and 
public works are misaligned regarding future outlook and understanding of CPS. Policies 
and oversight has not been developed within the CPS environment yet. 
                                                 
134 Beecham Research Limited, “M2M/IoT Sector Map: Beecham Research,” accessed April 17, 
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3. Section Summary 
This is the third and final section of analysis. This section described some 
emergent aspects of the HSE and public works regarding a possible Presumption of 
Cyber-Physical System and preparing for it. Based on both theoretical and realistic 
information through analysis of this section, a possible future relationship between the 
HSE and public works can be determined. 
The HSE recognizes CPS through literature of multiple sources; however, there is 
not any oversight yet on this movement from the HSE. Public works, on the other hand, 
has begun to experience the affects of CPS simply because public works institutions have 
regular interaction with private industry routinely. There is a very large push from 
academic, private industry and other institutions to pursue the concept of CPS further 
than either the HSE or public works has attempted thus far. These sources better 
understand the concept of future sensor technology and are more educated about the IoT 
and the IoE. This divergent understanding between the HSE, public works, and other 
institutions is cause for concern. For these reason, this area of intersection has been 




IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter proposes recommendations for the future relationship between 
the HSE and public works. These recommendations resolve the largest areas of 
inadequate working relationships between the HSE and public works as identified within 
the analysis of this thesis. This section answers the research sub-question: What are 
recommendations for the future relationship between the HSE and public works? 
The recommendations follow a simplified and loose adaptation of the 
commander’s intent from Joint Publication 5.0, which normally focuses on military 
operations planning.135 The commander’s intent contains three central factors: purpose 
(desired), end state, and operational risk. In addition, the final conclusion section 
provides potential next steps for research and academic study that will logically follow 
the topics that have been addressed within this thesis. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Based on analysis performed within the three selected areas of intersection 
between the HSE and public works, details have emerged in order to make an informed 
determination on the adequacy of the relationship. Results of the describe-compare-relate 
technique have offered insight on the relationship and have identified both common 
mission spaces and areas that require further attention to improve the relationship 
between the HSE and public works. The areas that require greatest attention will now be 
addressed through a set of brief recommendations for the future within each area of 
intersection. 
1. Recommendations—National Preparedness and Resilience 
After analysis within the area of intersection that addressed national preparedness 
and resilience, it was determined that there is an adequate relationship between the HSE 
and public works. However, recommendations are provided within this area of 
intersection in order to maintain the strong efforts that currently exist within the shared 
                                                 
135 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning, III-17.  
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mission spaces of national preparedness and resilience between the HSE and public 
works. 
a. Purpose (Desired) 
Literature from the HSE identifies mission spaces that rely on public works’ 
institutions. Public works is evidenced to have a relationship with the HSE primarily 
through actions within local communities, cities, and states. Although the HSE focuses 
nationally and public works operates locally, this contrast presented a logical divergence 
between both institutions. Even considering the difference between them and that there is 
an adequate relationship, there are still ways to continuously improve the relationship 
regardless.  
b. End State 
Public works’ infrastructure has been recognized nationwide as having structural 
deficiencies. Although infrastructure does not catastrophically fail every day, this concern 
remains a gap that could be resolved through strict financial planning. Structural 
deficiencies should be fully addressed as a whole nation through preemptive planning, 
not simply through recovery efforts incident by incident as infrastructure may randomly 
fail. There is a cost solution proposed that would bring the identified D+ rated 
infrastructure up to an acceptable grade level. Although there is agreement by 
stakeholders that infrastructure is crumbling, it is important and needs continuous 
upkeep. As of now, there is no grand plan to obtain the continuous level of upkeep 
necessary to sustain a satisfactory grade. The desired end state related to planning and 
budgeting would address this gap and place the nation’s infrastructure resiliency posture 
in a much more comfortable position.  
After incidents, costs to retroactively rebuild infrastructure and other financial 
considerations must be recognized. Extreme disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina or 
Superstorm Sandy, are exceptions to regularly occurring small incidents that affect local 
communities throughout the United States. However, under normal conditions, small 
incidents that occur frequently within local jurisdictions can often have deep financial 
impact because of extra costs associated to emergency work. There is an urgency 
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required to get infrastructure functional again after disasters but it is often more costly to 
perform emergency repairs retroactively than it is to prevent some areas of disaster 
preventatively. Though disasters are inevitable, recovery efforts should be focused on 
saving lives first. The secondary goal should focus on reduction of major rebuilding of 
infrastructure and components through resilient engineering designs and construction 
methods. A greater partnership among local public works agencies with larger 
institutions, such as the USACE or FEMA, on projects and strategic planning may prove 
advantageous in this area. 
Power, water, and sewer are among the most fundamental needs of citizens, but 
there are other needs as well, such as roadways. A further recommendation for 
consideration is the management of the Federal Highway Trust Fund budget. The 
shortfall of funds that supplies local agencies to maintain roadways should be 
reevaluated. If funding gaps remain in roadway maintenance, it will cause deterioration 
of roadways through lack of upkeep. According to PPD-21, there is supposed to be a 
“strong collaboration with critical infrastructure owners and operators.”136 In addition, 
PPD-21 also asserts that collaboration should be performed through sector specific 
agencies (SSAs); one of them is public works. However, the Highway Trust Fund is 
primarily managed at the federal level. Highways are significant infrastructure with 
potential to impact local jurisdictions if not kept in good working order. Easy access to 
and from cities are one of the ways that municipalities remain economically healthy. 
Roadways are heavily maintained by local agencies; yet, local sources do not have much 
leverage in the process without the continuous federal funding. A unity of effort between 
the HSE and public works would increase the collaboration necessary to accomplish this 
goal. 
c. Operational Risk 
As identified, public works infrastructure are critical components of the United 
States’ way of life. If continuous upkeep and maintenance of these systems are not 
addressed, the nation runs a risk of placing citizens in unnecessary danger. There are 
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steep national budgetary implications that would be required to retrofit the nation’s public 
works infrastructure, but the risk of not addressing these needs is worse. In order to bring 
infrastructure above a D+ rating, an incredible amount of funding will need to be sourced 
or possibly transferred from other projects. This funding gap will have major financial 
impact, and the struggles and tradeoff of efforts placed on one area over another may 
impact the balance in unanticipated ways. The full risks are unknown and will need to be 
further evaluated for potential impact. 
After disasters, retroactive funding and repairs become extraordinary; however, 
there are certain mitigation techniques that can be implemented through engineering 
designs prior to incidents. Some levels of construction resiliency can be built-in but not 
without added costs. One risk involved with construction resiliency is that not all 
infrastructures can be feasibly over-engineered in this manner. The costs to perform this 
work nationwide on every piece of infrastructure would be astronomical and perhaps 
unobtainable. Since disasters are unpredictable because we do not necessarily know 
where the next natural (or manmade) disaster will strike, methods of evaluation are 
necessary and must be further developed to avoid this risk. 
Another risk that may be encountered is empowering localized jurisdictions with 
greater authority to be involved with the management of the Highway Trust Fund. What 
has traditionally been a national decision would need to transition to a shared 
responsibilities with local agencies. This could pose a source of dissention among the 
national institution, which has always had the decision power left to them. 
2. Recommendations—Cyberspace Safety and Security 
According to U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Cyberspace is the nervous 
system of these infrastructures - the control system of our country.”137 
a. Purpose (Desired) 
Through analysis of cyberspace safety and security, this section revealed an area 
where the relationship between the HSE and public works is mediocre and needs to be 
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strengthened. Although the relationship is mediocre, there are a few key areas of focus 
that should initially be addressed that can help elevate the relationship to obtain an 
adequate level. 
b. End State 
Cyberspace as it relates to the HSE and public works has some unique concerns 
related to threats. Public works provides SCADA and ICS services that provide real-time 
situational awareness for some infrastructure. Some of these sensor systems are already 
in place, such as power grid monitoring, water systems pressure and flow rates, and 
nuclear facility monitoring. Without monitoring systems in place, there are historical 
cases that show extensive issues that can occur. Two major events include the northeast 
power outage and the TMI nuclear meltdown. There are potentially other areas of 
responsibility within public works that may cause widespread issues in similar scales as 
these if systems remain unchecked. Situational awareness about other infrastructure can 
be further obtained through advanced development of sensor systems. More advanced 
sensor systems can help preventatively monitor for events such as pipeline oil spills, 
bridge structural weaknesses or degradation of construction materials. This type of data 
will prove more necessary in the future as cyberspace and technology continues to 
proliferate, which will make it easier and less expensive to develop. 
The HSE needs to fully address and place security regulations on public works’ 
operations in similar fashion as the nuclear and power distribution industries have. It took 
major disastrous events for sweeping changes to occur, but the potential for disaster 
should not be ignored. Even threats such as the Stuxnet virus can cause major disruption 
to services if cyberspace measures are not kept in check. This can be accomplished 
through required national policies that effect local agencies through creation of 
standardized cyberspaces security measures. These types of requirements would help 
eliminate the false sense of security through obscurity often found in local agencies that 
are not bound by the likes of FISMA, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, or the National 
Energy Regulatory Commission. Perhaps an equal governance system should be 
implemented within the public works industry that maintains a consistent standard. 
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c. Operational Risk 
The operational risk of adding more regulation on public works’ process is that it 
could raise costs and/or slow progress. Regulations can add additional red-tape, which 
would also require additional staffing to implement and maintain. In addition to added 
expenses that may incur, new governing bodies would need to be created in order to fully 
regulate all of these activities.  
Real-time situational awareness is the desire of the HSE, and public works is 
already aware of the technology and has been monitoring select infrastructure for years. 
However, the operational risk posed through lack of real-time situational awareness on 
infrastructure can potentially allow preventable incidents to occur. Or, efforts may be 
placed on retrofit of the incorrect asset because there is not an established guideline for 
maintenance for all areas of responsibility relating to public works infrastructure. Sensor 
systems can help prevent issues through monitoring and addressing many real-time 
needs. Without real-time monitoring, there is a constant risk to infrastructure of unknown 
proportion. The area of cyberspace relating to SCADA and ICS needs further research 
and analysis in order to gain a full understanding of the situation and develop full courses 
of action.  
3. Recommendations—Presumption of Cyber-Physical Systems 
Through analysis of this section, it was determined that this area of intersection 
between the HSE and public works is an inadequate relationship. This section also makes 
claims on future planning, strategy, and innovation about things that have not quite been 
integrated within the industry yet. There is enough evidence though to make some 
predictive presumptions about the best course of action for cyber-physical systems. 
a. Purpose (Desired) 
Interconnected systems are emerging now. The Internet of things and the Internet 
of everything are creating a situation that has not been seen before. Cyber and physical 
worlds are intertwining. There is a need for further research, policy, and regulation of 
security factors within cyber-physical systems by government agencies. Public works is 
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the guardian of infrastructure, and as part of that responsibility needs to be concerned 
with understanding and implementing strong policies. The relationship with the HSE can 
assist in this endeavor. 
b. End State 
Sensor networks will increase, autonomous vehicles on roadways will increase, 
and the Internet is on its way to becoming ubiquitous even in traditionally manual 
systems and processes that public works is involved in. Monitoring of infrastructure in 
order to prevent the next big disaster is a reality. As of writing this article, a passenger 
rail incident in Pennsylvania caused loss of life, property, and hampered public 
transportation. It could have been prevented if the cyber-physical concepts were 
integrated into the current control system. The National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) already has efforts in place to install an advanced safety system called positive 
train control (PTC). 
Other infrastructure has already implemented cyber-physical systems on small 
scales. South Korea has one of the most interconnected bridges in the world with an 
integrated sensor system monitoring stress, corrosion, and other key indicators. The 
energy sector already has sensors installed on power lines that monitor system health, 
ultimately reporting back to the Smart Grid systems. These examples should be used as 
models for further advancement of CPS within the United States. Both the HSE and 
public works needs to be aggressive within this arena and not leave the research to 
private industry and education. 
c. Operational Risk 
There is an operational risk to most technology advancements, and this may 
further increase when incorporated into public works’ processes. Risks may grow if 
public works is not ready for new challenges that it is not prepared to undertake. Other 
risks involve the unknown exponential future of technology growth, especially in 
conjunction with the Internet. There are unknown consequences and side effects of 
deploying these systems. Public works must operate systems in similar manners as the 
nuclear and power industries with cyberspace requirements in place. A potential 
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drawback to additional oversight can create a burden on local agencies. However, a 
strong partnership in this area with the HSE can help resolve this issue through either 
financial or personnel aspects.  
Out of the three recommendations, the area of intersection relating to cyber-
physical systems between the HSE and public works warrants the most caution. It would 
also require the most academic study in order to understand many of the implications of 
it, and help develop the entire CPS industry since it is relatively new. The HSE and 
public works relationship can strengthen most through this endeavor. Physical 
infrastructure is addressed, cyberspace is addressed, and a new area of study can be 
further developed but through safe measures under the watchful eye of both the HSE and 
public works. Ultimately, the citizens of the United States will be safer as a result of this 
recommendation. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Additional academic research is needed to examine models for and implications 
of, the recommendations presented in this thesis. There were two primary topics that 
surfaced. First, would equal governance on all public works institutions be too intrusive 
within the areas of intersection or is it necessary in order to prevent the next big event? 
Using the nuclear and energy sectors as models can the same concepts apply to other 
public works areas of responsibilities? Secondly, cyber-physical systems as it relates to 
public works should be further researched and expanded. What are the implications to a 
hyper-interconnected system of systems? 
The HSE is constantly looking for partners to work within mission spaces, and 
public works has a lot to offer in these areas at the local level. Though public works is 
recognized to a certain degree within the HSE community, it is not fully utilized to the 
greatest potential it could be. In final conclusion of this thesis, through the course of this 
analysis, it has become abundantly evident that public works is an important contributor 
to the HSE in many ways. Local public works institutions support the HSE primarily 
through actions, but the relationship has plenty of room to expand, which will ultimately 
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benefit the millions of United States citizens. The HSE and public works have a 
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